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Incomplete Exclusivity and Fair
Representation: Inevitable Tensions in
Florida's Public Sector Labor Law
DENNIS 0. LYNCH*
An amendment to Florida's Public Employee Relations Act
(PERA) allows a union to refuse to process a nonmember's
grievance to arbitraion. If a certified union elects this option,
the nonmember may proceed with the representative of his
choice, including a rival union, thereby undermining the certi-
fied union's exclusive representative status. If the certified
union refuses on grounds other than the employee's nonmem-
bership, the individual has no statutory right to proceed unless
the union breached its duty of fair representation. The author
explores Florida's Public Employee Relations Commission's
(PERC)decisions illustrating the balance between individual
and collective rights under the concepts of exclusive represen-
tation, fair representation, and due process. The author con-
cludes that PERC needs to implement procedures to reflect
more fairly individual employees' interests.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Collective bargaining is traditionally conceptualized as a sys-
tem of self-government designed to rationalize the process of de-
termining work rules, wages, and benefits.' Two collective entities
control this governing process-the union and the employer.
Through collective agreements the union and the employer set the
parameters of the law of the workplace. The specific meanings of
general contract clauses subsequently are developed on a case-by-
case basis through grievance procedures and arbitration.2
The doctrine of exclusive representation protects the union's
control over both the initial formulation of the contractual frame-
work and the development of a common law of the workplace.'
The union's governing power is not, however, absolute. Competing
interests of individual employees may diverge from the concerns of
the collective.4 In choosing among these competing interests, a
union must not make invidious, discriminatory, or arbitrary dis-
tinctions among employees.6 The union must fairly represent all
employees, even those in a right-to-work state who have exercised
their option of refusing to join the union or to pay their share of
1. In the language of the Supreme Court, a collective agreement "calls into being a new
common law." United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 579
(1960); see Cox, Reflections Upon Labor Arbitration, 72 HARv. L. REV. 1482 (1959); Feller,
A General Theory of the Collective Bargaining Agreement, 61 CALIF. L. REV. 663, 718-24
(1973); Summers, Individual Rights in Collective Agreements and Arbitration, 37 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 362 (1962).
For the view that this analogy distorts rather than clarifies the reality of the industrial
world because it obscures the unequal power of management and labor, see Stone, The
Post-War Paradigm in American Labor Law, 90 YALE L.J. 1509 (1981).
2. Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 191 (1967); United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navi-
gation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 579 (1960); see Cox, supra note 1, at 1499-500; Feller, supra note 1,
at 718-24.
3. Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. at 191-93.
4. See, e.g., Humphrey v. Moore, 375 U.S. 335 (1964); Gregg v. Teamsters Local 150,
699 F.2d 1015 (9th Cir. 1983); Barton Brands, Ltd. v. NLRB, 529 F.2d 793 (7th Cir. 1976);
Truck Drivers Local Union 568 v. NLRB, 379 F.2d 137 (D.C. Cir. 1967).




the cost of bargaining and administering a collective agreement.,
One of the most persistent and difficult issues of labor law has
been how to maintain the discretion unions need to fulfill their
governing obligations while protecting minority interests from dis-
criminatory or arbitrary decisions in the name of the majority.7
The problem is magnified in those situations where there are in-
herent tensions between the union and a subgroup of employees,
such as "free-riding" nonmembers.8
The tension between a bargaining agent and nonmembers of
the union is not normally given formal recognition in labor doc-
trine on exclusive and fair representation, but the Florida legisla-
ture has changed this by amending the Public Employee Relations
Act (PERA) to allow a certified bargaining agent to refuse to pro-
cess a nonmember's individual contract grievance.9 This amend-
6. Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171 (1967); International Union of the United Ass'n of Jour-
neymen Local 141 v. NLRB, 675 F.2d 1257 (D.C. Cir. 1982); International Ass'n of Machin-
ists Local 697, 223 N.L.R.B. 832 (1976).
7. There is an extensive body of scholarly commentary on these issues. See, e.g., Blum-
rosen, The Worker and Three Phases of Unionism: Administrative and Judicial Control of
the Worker-Union Relationship, 61 MICH. L. REV. 1435 (1963); Feller, supra note 1; Finkin,
The Limits of Majority Rule in Collective Bargaining, 64 MINN. L. REV. 183 (1980); Freed,
Polsby & Spitzer, Unions, Fairness and the Conundrums of Collective Choice, 56 S. CAL. L.
REV. 461 (1983); Leffler, Piercing the Duty of Fair Representation: The Dichotomy Between
Negotiations and Grievance Handling, 1979 U. ILL. L.F. 35; Levy, The Collective Agree-
ment as a Limitation on Union Control of Employee Grievances, 118 U. PA. L. REV. 1036
(1970); Summers, The Individual Employee's Right Under the Collective Agreement: What
Constitutes Fair Representation?, 126 U. PA. L. REV. 251 (1977).
8. See International Union of the United Ass'n of Journeymen Local 141 v. NLRB, 675
F.2d at 1262-82 (Mivke, J., dissenting).
9. 1977 Fla. Laws ch. 77-343, § 14 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 447.401 (1983)).
Grievance procedures.-Each public employer and bargaining agent shall negoti-
ate a grievance procedure to be used for the settlement of disputes between em-
ployer and employee, or group of employees, involving the interpretation or ap-
plication of a collective bargaining agreement. Such grievance procedure shall
have as its terminal step a final and binding disposition by an impartial neutral,
mutually selected by the parties. However, an arbiter or other neutral shall not
have the power to add to, subtract from, modify, or alter the terms of a collec-
tive bargaining agreement. If an employee organization is certified as the bar-
gaining agent of a unit, the grievance procedure then in existence may be the
subject of collective bargaining, and any agreement which is reached shall super-
sede the previously existing procedure. All public employees shall have the right
to a fair and equitable grievance procedure, administered without regard to
membership or nonmembership in any organization, except that certified em-
ployee organizations shall not be required to process grievances for employees
who are not members of the organization. A career service employee shall have
the option of utilizing the civil service appeal procedure or a grievance procedure
established under this section, but such employee cannot use both a civil service
appeal and a grievance procedure.
FLA. STAT § 447.401 (1983).
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ment relieves unions of the burden and cost of grieving for non-
members; it also creates an incentive for public employees to join
unions. At the same time, the amendment has a potential negative
impact on bargaining agents because the option to refuse represen-
tation undermines exclusive representation. When a union refuses
to grieve for a nonmember, the employee has the option of pursu-
ing the grievance individually, thereby influencing the common law
of the workplace.10
The inconsistency between this amendment and traditional
doctrines of fair and exclusive representation has spawned an in-
triguing series of unfair labor practice decisions by Florida's Public
Employee Relations Commission (PERC)."1 Non-union employees
have filed unfair labor practice charges against public employers.
The employees claim that the amendment, combined with other
statutory provisions, grants nonmembers a statutory option of tak-
ing an individual grievance to arbitration without going through
the union.1 2 PERC has rejected this argument, relying on private
sector precedent concerning the significance of exclusive represen-
tation in a collective bargaining system to justify leaving control
over grievances with bargaining agents."
While PERC adopts the policies underlying the rationale that
justifies the balance between collective and individual rights in the
private sector, the Commission does not address the fundamental
issues raised by the application of these policies in the public sec-
tor." There may be substantial differences between private and
public sector collective bargaining that would result in different
10. See In re School Bd. of Leon County, [19811 7 FLA. PUB. EMPLOYEE REP. (LAB. REL.
PRESS) 1 12,286 (June 26, 1981); Heath v. School Bd., [1979] 5 FLA. PUB. EMPLOYEE REP.
(LAB. RE. PRESS) 10,074 (Mar. 20, 1979). The Florida Public Employee Reporter will here-
inafter be cited as "F.P.E.R."
11. Leon County Classroom Teachers' Ass'n v. School Bd., 363 So. 2d 353 (Fla. 1st DCA
1978); Florida PBA v. State, [1982] 8 F.P.E.R. 1 13,059 (Jan. 13, 1982); Galbreath v. Brow-
ard County Classroom Teachers' Ass'n, [1981] 7 F.P.E.R. 12,288 (June 26, 1981); Gal-
breath v. School Rd., [1981] 7 F.P.E.R. 1 12,287 (June 26, 1981), afld, 424 So. 2d 837 (Fla.
4th DCA 1982), aff'd, 9 FLA. L. WEEKLY 33 (Sup. Ct. Jan. 26, 1984); In re School Rd. of Leon
County, [19811 7 F.P.E.R. 12,286 (June 26, 1982); Heath v. School Bd., [1979] 5 F.P.E.R.
10,074 (Mar. 20, 1979).
12. See Galbreath v. School Bd., [1981] 7 F.P.E.R. 1 12,286; Heath v. School Bd., [19791
5 F.P.E.R. 1 10,074.
13. In re School Bd. of Leon County, [1981] 7 F.P.E.R. 12,287; Heath v. School Bd.,
[19791 5 F.P.E.R. 1 10,074.
14. For a discussion of the claim that individual employees in the public sector should
have access, as individuals, to grievance procedures, arbitration, and the courts to protect
rights growing out of collective agreements, see H. WELLINGTON & R. WINTER, THE UNIONS
AND THE CITIES 162-64 (1971).
[Vol. 37:573
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balances between union and employee interests. In addition, there
are other sources of law outside of labor doctrine that could be
used by individual public sector employees to challenge the tradi-
tional private sector balance. State action is involved in public sec-
tor collective agreements; therefore, due process arguably requires
that fair representation doctrine be more sensitive to the concerns
of individual employees."5 For example, there is an inherent ten-
sion between a certified bargaining agent and a nonmember em-
ployee who does not contribute to the costs of grievance process-
ing. Questions arise about the unbiased judgment of a union that
assumes control of a nonmember's grievance and that then refuses
to take the grievance to arbitration on the grounds that the griev-
ance lacks merit." Indeed, it can be argued that it is a violation of
due process for a union ever to deny any employee a hearing by a
neutral arbitrator on the employee's right to benefits under a col-
lective agreement.
17
Although courts have rarely faced the due process issue di-
rectly, the general understanding is that fair representation satis-
fies due process.'" Federal courts have avoided subjecting fair rep-
resentation doctrine to traditional due process analysis by reading
into labor statutes affirmative obligations rather than finding state
action in the certification of an exclusive bargaining agent.' 9 In the
15. For a challenge to exclusive union control over grievances based on such an argu-
ment, see Winston v. United States Postal Serv., 585 F.2d 198 (7th Cir. 1978).
16. The union arguably has a pecuniary interest in the treatment of nonmember griev-
ances because the union receives more dues if concern over the processing of grievances
results in increased membership. An adjudicator with a pecuniary interest in the outcome of
a dispute is not "impartial" under due process doctrine. Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 U.S. 564
(1973); Ward v. Village of Monroeville, 409 U.S. 57 (1972); Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510
(1927). For a discussion of the due process issues raised by the union's interest in the out-
come of a nonmember's grievance, see infra text accompanying notes 144-168.
17. See Note, Public Sector Grievance Procedures, Due Process, and the Duty of Fair
Representation, 89 HAnv. L. REv. 752 (1976). See also infra text accompanying notes 222-
227.
18. Steele v. Louisville & N.R.R., 323 U.S. 192 (1944); Winston v. United States Postal
Serv., 585 F.2d. 198 (7th Cir. 1978).
19. The issue of whether the certification of a union as an exclusive bargaining agent
constitutes state action has emerged in a number of different contexts. The Constitution
could have provided such a basis for the holding of the Supreme Court in Steele, v. Louis-
ville & Nashville Railroad. Instead of directly facing the state action issue, the Court inter-
preted the Railway Labor Act as creating a statutory obligation of a union not to discrimi-
nate. 323 U.S. 192 (1944). The Supreme Court next held that the National Labor Relations
Act (NLRA) incorporated a similar statutory duty. Syres v. Oil Workers Int'l Union Local
23, 350 U.S. 892 (1955). Similarly, the Supreme Court read into the Railway Labor Act a
statutory duty of a union not to spend employee dues for political causes that the individual
employee opposes. International Ass'n of Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740 (1961).
The state action issue has also arisen in the context of whether National Labor Rela-
1983]
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public sector, however, it is impossible to avoid the confrontation
between the two concepts."0
This article uses the PERC decisions concerned with the con-
flict between certified bargaining agents and nonmember employ-
ees to explore the relationship between due process and fair repre-
sentation; it will also identify differences between the policies
underlying public and private sector bargaining that might be ued
to justify a distinct balance between collective and individual in-
terests in the public sector. The first section describes how PERC
has dealt with the contradiction between the union's option to re-
fuse representation to a nonmember and the doctrine of exclusive
representation; the last section deals with fair representation and
due process.
Throughout the section on public sector fair representation
doctrine there are two basic concerns. First is the issue of the ap-
propriate standard of procedural fairness to which a union should
be held in making judgments about employee grievances.2 1 The
second concern is whether a procedurally fair decision could still
violate the duty of fair representation because the union's substan-
tive reasons for favoring the interests of one group of employees
over another are unjust.2 The article concludes that there is cur-
rently no theory of distributive justice to measure the substantive
fairness of a union's decision, so long as the union's reasons are
tions Board (NLRB) certification of a union that discriminates in membership along lines of
race or national origin would be tantamount to unconstitutional governmental discrimina-
tion. At first the Board held that the certification of a union would be unconstitutional if
the employer could demonstrate the union discriminated. Bekins Moving and Storage Co.,
211 NLRB 138 (1974). Three years later the Board reversed its position, finding that control
over discrimination through unfair labor practice proceedings subsequent to certification
provided an adequate remedy. Handy Andy, Inc., 228 NLRB 447 (1977). The Court of Ap-
peals for the District of Columbia has endorsed this latter view by regarding certification as
imposing an affirmative obligation on private associations not to discriminate. Bell & Howell
Co. v. NLRB, 598 F.2d 136 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 942 (1979). Two other courts
of appeals, however, have ruled that the Constitution does require the NLRB to deny certi-
fication to a union that discriminates on the basis of race in its membership or contract
negotiations. NLRB v. Mansion House Center Management Corp., 473 F.2d 471 (8th Cir.
1973); NLRB v. Heavy Lift Serv., Inc., 607 F.2d 1121 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 449 U.S.
822 (1980).
20. See Winston v. United States Postal Serv., 585 F.2d at 207-09 (an employee has a
property interest in expectancies based on a just-cause-for-discharge clause of a collective
agreement with the United States Postal Service).
21. See, e.g., Smith v. Hussman Refrigerator Co., 619 F.2d 1229 (8th Cir.), cert. denied,
449 U.S. 839 (1980); Saginario v. Attorney General, 87 N.J. 480, 435 A.2d 1134 (1981).
22. See, e.g., Gregg v. Teamsters Local 150, 699 F.2d 1015 (9th Cir. 1983) (union lacked
substantial reasons for sacrificing the grievances of one group of employees in order to im-
prove the likelihood of succeeding on the grievances of other employees).
[Vol. 37:573
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consistent with its statutory obligations.2 Bargaining agents
should, however, be required to articulate their reasons for a sub-
stantive decision not to grieve whenever there is a basis for ques-
tioning the union's impartiality. Requiring the union to explain its
reasons would contribute to the legitimacy of the union's exclusive
control and will provide information that the membership needs to
alter similar decisions in the future if a majority disagrees with the
union's rationale.
II. UNION CONTROL OVER INDIVIDUAL GRIEVANCES UNDER PERA
In Heath v. School Board,2 4 PERC first faced the tension be-
tween the doctrine of exclusive representation and the amendment
allowing the certified bargaining agent to refuse to grieve for a
nonmember. The facts of Heath illustrate the practical problems
that the amendment fostered. Brian Heath filed an individual
grievance with the school board without seeking representation by,
or the participation of, the Orange County Classroom Teachers As-
sociation (OCCTA), the certified bargaining agent.2 Instead the
FEA/United, a rival union, assisted Heath.2
The school board denied Heath's request for arbitration on
the ground that the grievance was not arbitrable under the collec-
tive agreement because the certified bargaining agent, OCCTA,
had not submitted the request. Heath filed unfair labor practice
charges claiming that the contract provision, which gave the union
a monopoly over the submission of grievances to arbitration, vio-
lated his statutory right to arbitrate an individual grievance.1
OCCTA intervened to protect its interests as the certified bargain-
ing agent.
In support of his statutory argument, Heath distinguished the
language and organization of PERA from that of the National La-
bor Relations Act (NLRA). He argued that, although the Florida
legislature relied heavily on the NLRA in drafting PERA, the leg-
islature diverged significantly from the NLRA in drafting the sec-
tions on exclusive representation and grievance procedures.2
Heath argued that these differences reflected the legislature's in-
tent to strike a distinct balance between collective and individual
23. See Freed, Polsby & Spitzer, supra note 7.
24. [1979] 5 F.P.E.R. 10,074, at 90 (Mar. 20, 1979).
25. Id.
26. Id. at 96 n.1.
27. Id. at 90.
28. Id. at 91.
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interests. He argued that sections 447.301(4), 447.401 and
447.501(1)(f) of PERA, read together, preserve the employee's
right to select his own representative and to control his grievance
over individual job interests.2 9
The facts of Heath cast in the worst possible light the statu-
tory argument in favor of an employee's being allowed to grieve on
his own. The minority union in Heath was attempting to use con-
tract grievance procedures to gain support for its struggle to dis-"
place the certified bargaining agent. PERC's response to this
threat to exclusive representation was predictable. PERC rejected
Heath's statutory argument using little analysis; it relied heavily
on United States Supreme Court precedent to emphasize the criti-
cal role that exclusive representation plays in a system of collective
bargaining.80 The narrow holding of Heath is that it is not an un-
fair labor practice for a public employer to refuse to arbitrate a
non-union employee's grievance where the employee has not asked
the certified bargaining agent to represent him, and where the col-
lective bargaining agreement provides that only the certified bar-
gaining agent may submit a grievance to arbitration.-1
Beyond this narrow holding, a host of practical questions re-
mained unanswered. Could the school board have arbitrated with-
out committing an unfair labor practice? If the union does refuse
to grieve for a nonmember, what are the rights of that individual
under the collective agreement? May the nonmember then grieve
individually? How will the arbitrator be selected? Can a rival
union represent the nonmember? Will the bargaining agent still be
allowed to participate? These are just a few examples of the type
of questions PERC has faced in the four years since Heath.
The central question posed by the aggrieved employee in
Heath was one of statutory interpretation. As the dissenting Com-
missioner pointed out, 2 the majority did not confront the differ-
ences in language and structure between PERA and the NLRA.
PERC simply assumed that the appropriate balance between col-
lective and individual rights in public sector bargaining is the same
as in private sector bargaining.
A third set of issues arises from the implications of the Heath
29. For an analysis of the statutory interpretation issues, see infra text accompanying
notes 91-143.
30. [1979] [5] F.P.E.R. at 91. (relying on Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209
(1977); Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171 (1967)).
31. Id. at 93.
32. Id. at 93-96.,
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decision for the duty of fair representation. A nonmember with a
grievance must first ask the certified bargaining agent to represent
him. The Commission's opinion in Heath suggests, and subsequent
decisions have confirmed, that if the union declines to grieve on
grounds other than the individual's nonmembership, the nonmem-
ber's only recourse is to charge the union with breach of its duty of
fair representation. 3 Although there is tension inherent in the re-
lationship between the nonmember and the bargaining agent.
Nonetheless, the nonmember employee cannot obtain a hearing on
the merits of his grievance unless he proves that the bargaining
agent acted arbitrarily or in bad faith in refusing to process the
grievance. To the extent that the grievance involves an expectation
such as job security, which could be characterized as a property
right, the failure to consider the merits of the grievance beyond the
union's own investigation raises due process problems.8 4
The practical considerations, the statutory issues, and the re-
lationship between fair representation doctrine and due process all
merit careful analysis. Before addressing the latter two sets of is-
sues, it is important to provide a more complete picture of the way
PERC has balanced, on a case-by-case basis, the doctrine of exclu-
sive representation and the situation of the nonmember. The way
PERC has resolved the practical considerations provides a context
for examining the issues of statutory interpretation raised in
Heath.
A. Exclusive Representation and Nonmember Grievances:
PERC's View
1. UNION CONTROL OVER ALL GRIEVANCES
The first issue to emerge after Heath concerned the discretion
of a public employer in a similar situation to arbitrate an individ-
ual employee's grievance without committing an unfair labor prac-
tice. 5 PERC consolidated the control of exclusive bargaining
33. See Galbreath v. Broward County Classroom Teachers' Ass'n., [1981] 7 F.P.E.R.
12,288 (June 26, 1981); Galbreath v. School Bd. [1981] 7 F.P.E.R. 1 12,287 (June 26, 1981),
af'd, 424 So. 2d. 837 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982). These decisions were recently affirmed by the
Florida Supreme Court. See Galbreath v. School Bd., 9 FLA. L. WEEKLY 33 (Sup. Ct. Jan. 26,
1984).
34. See Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341 (1976); Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134 (1974);
Perry v. Sinderman, 408 U.S. 593 (1972); Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972); cf.
Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422 (1982) (adjudicatory procedures must survive
due process and equal protection considerations).
35. Leon County Classroom Teachers' Ass'n v. School Bd., [19801 6 F.P.E.R. I 11001
1983]
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agents by ruling that the employer could not arbitrate the griev-
ance unless the employee had first asked the certified agent to re-
present him." Otherwise, the employer would be refusing to dis-
cuss the grievance in good faith and engaging in a unilateral breach
of the terms and conditions of employment by using a noncontrac-
tual method to resolve a grievance. 7
A second concern involved the bargaining agent's power to
grieve with or without the cooperation, of the grievant. PERC held
that a certified agent has the power "to initiate and process griev-
ances without obtaining the consent of the employer, employee or
group of employees." 8 PERC was responding to a request for a
declaratory opinion on a certified bargaining agent's authority to
process a grievance in its own name without a petition by the af-
fected employee. The Commission's reasoning in that case is con-
sistent with the predominant private sector theory that collective
agreements vest rights in the collective and not in the individual
employee. The outer limits of that theory, however, are problem-
atic when applied in the public sector.,"
Many of the job security guarantees in collective agreements
overlap with existing individual statutory rights protected by civil
service appeal procedures40 or with other statutory guarantees.4
There is a potential for conflict between an individual employee's
right to pursue a grievance with representation of his choice
through such statutory procedures and a bargaining agent's power
to proceed through contract grievance procedures.
In a case where such an overlap of forums exists, the individ-
ual employee, rather than the union, should control the initial
choice of forum. The Florida legislature preserved in PERA section
447.401 the option of career civil service employees to use the civil
service appeal system instead of contract grievance procedures.4'
(Dec. 3, 1979).
36. Id. at 3-4.
37. Id. at 4.
38. In re Duval Teachers United Local 3326, [1979] 5 F.P.E.R. 10,353 (Oct. 10, 1979),
afl'd, 393 So. 2d 1151 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981).
39. For an excellent exposition of the private sector theory of collectively held rights,
see Feller, supra note 1.
40. Article III, section 14 of the Florida Constitution mandates a civil service system for
state employees and allows counties and municipalities to establish their own civil service
systems. Most of these systems establish a civil service commission, which has the power to
"hear appeals arising out of any suspension, reduction in pay, transfer, layoff, demotion, or
dismissal of any permanent employee." FLA. STAT. § 110.305(3) (1983).
41. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 231.36(6) (1983) (teachers' appeal procedure).
42. "A career service employee shall have the option of utilizing the civil service appeal
[Vol. 37:573
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This provision would be rendered meaningless if the union could
either force the employee to grieve under contract procedures or
bargain away the employee's option. A Florida appellate court con-
firmed this view in dicta in a case in which a public employer re-
sisted arbitration on the ground that contract grievance procedures
could not be used to resolve a grievance if statutory appeal proce-
dures existed.43 The court went on to observe that section 447.401
preserved any procedural or substantive employee safeguards in
excess of those provided by contract grievance procedures: "[T]he
legislature did not intend to permit a public employer to negotiate
a collective bargaining agreement in which it relinquishes a statu-
tory duty or in which its employees relinquish statutory rights.
The agreement may add to statutory rights and duties, but may
not diminish them."
44
An employee's decision to pursue a remedy through a statu-
tory procedure normally will not concern the certified bargaining
agent unless a rival union is in the picture.' A minority union will
have some incentive to help employees pursue noncontractual ap-
peals in order to gain their support. Even in this situation, the bar-
gaining agent has no real basis on which to object so long as no
issues of contract interpretation are involved and the appeal does
not establish statutory case law that would later operate as prece-
dent in the resolution of contract disputes by arbitrators.
The question of representation becomes more complex if the
public employer convinces the union to incorporate the statutory
appeal procedure into the collective agreement. This situation
arose in Broward County Classroom Teachers Association, Inc. v.
School Board.' School board policy, established by a regulation,
required that all employees be allowed to appeal certain personnel
matters to the full board for a final determination. The bargaining
agent agreed to incorporate that appeal procedure into the collec-
tive agreement as an alternative to contract grievance procedures
that result in final and binding arbitration. The agreement gave
the individual employee the option of following either procedure so
procedure or a grievance procedure established under this section, but such employee can-
not use both a civil service appeal and a grievance procedure." FLA. STAT. § 447.401 (1981).
43. PERC v. District School Bd., 374 So. 2d 1005, 1008 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979).
44. Id. at 1015.
45. The two major PERC decisions, Heath and In re Leon County, grew out of situa-
tions where rival unions were attempting to represent bargaining unit employees in griev-
ances. See Heath v. School Bd., [1979] 5 F.P.E.R. 10,074 at 96 n.1 (Mar. 20, 1979); In re
School Bd. of Leon County, [1981] 7 F.P.E.R. 12,286 at 578 (June 26, 1981).
46. [1982] 8 F.P.E.R. 13,283 (June 30, 1982).
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long as the grievance did not raise issues of contract interpreta-
tion.4 7 A rival union organization then began representing employ-
ees who opted for the alternative procedure. The certified bargain-
ing agent objected and filed unfair labor practice charges against
the school board and the rival union."'
The hearing examiner ruled that the board policy, which al-
lowed the employee to select his own representative, governed the
alternative procedure.4 9 PERC reversed, finding that it was permis-
sible for a union to agree to a procedure as an alternative to final
and binding arbitration, but that any waiver of exclusive represen-
tation in any grievance procedure incorporated into a collective
agreement would have to be "clear and unmistak*able. ' ' 50 The con-
tract clause in question did not constitute such a waiver.
2. RIGHTS OF A NONMEMBER WHO IS REFUSED REPRESENTATION
The Heath majority suggested in dicta that, if a bargaining
agent refuses to grieve for an employee on the ground of the em-
ployee's nonmembership in the union, the employee has a statu-
tory right to proceed individually. 1 The statute mandates equal
access by all bargaining unit employees to a fair and equitable
grievance procedure.2 The most obvious issue arising out of the
nonmember employee's right to proceed individually, is whether
the grievance procedure can be "fair" if the nonmember is not free
to choose his own representative, even if the representative is a
rival union.
PERC ruled in Florida PBA v. State5 s that a rival union may
represent the nonmember grievant. In that case, the certified bar-
gaining agent declined to grieve for a nonmember. With the assis-
tance of a rival union, the nonmember grievant filed a request for
arbitration. The public employer refused to process the request,
and the rival union filed an unfair labor practice charge.5 4 PERC
47. Id. at 507-08.
48. The ground for the unfair labor practice charge against the school board was that
the board was recognizing a minority union and maintaining grievance procedures that vio-
lated section 447.401 of the Florida Statutes. The unfair labor practice charge against the
union was for seeking recognition in a unit where another union was already certified as the
exclusive bargaining agent. Id. at 507.
49. Id. at 516.
50. Id. at 509.
51. Heath, [19791 5 F.P.E.R. at 92-93.
52. FLA. STAT. § 447.401 (1983).
53. [19821 8 F.P.E.R. 13,059 (Jan. 13, 1982).
54. Id. at 107.
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upheld the charge, finding that the logic of Heath did not extend
to a nonmember's choice of representative. 55
PERC reasoned that the certified union, by refusing to re-
present the nonmember employee, had waived any claim to exclu-
sive representative status. The employer's interest in the affiliation
of the personnel representative was insufficient to overcome the in-
dividual's right to select his own representative. PERC held that
free choice of a personnel representative, after the bargaining
agent has refused representation of an employee on the basis of
nonmembership in the union, was an integral part of the statutory
right to a "fair and equitable grievance procedure."56
The decision in that case could have gone either way. Allowing
the nonmember complete freedom to choose a representative opens
the door for a rival union to use grievance procedures as a means
of gaining support. The ability of the bargaining agent and em-
ployer to control issues of contract interpretation may be under-
mined, resulting in a negative impact On the stability of labor rela-
tions. On the other hand, the PBA decision exerts pressure on the
bargaining agent to grieve for nonmembers, a preferred result from
the perspective of stable labor relations. If a bargaining agent de-
cides to run the risk of refusing to represent nonmembers in order
to encourage membership or save union funds, the competition en-
gendered by a rival union may be beneficial to bargaining unit
employees.
The PBA decision presents a practical response to a problem
that has no obviously preferable solution. There is simply an inher-
ent contradiction between the principle of exclusive representation
and the PERA provision for nonmember grievances. Heath gives
the bargaining agent the option to protect its position by repre-
senting nonmember employees in contract grievance proceedings.
If the agent does not exercise that option, then the statute requires
that the grievance process still be as fair as possible for the indi-
vidual employee.
A more complicated issue is whether the refusal to grieve for
the nonmember constitutes a waiver by the bargaining agent of its
right to participate in any grievance proceedings initiated individu-
ally by the nonmember. A union that anticipates this problem is
likely to request a contract clause guaranteeing it the right to be
present at any meeting, including arbitration hearings, called for
55. Id. at 109.
56. Id. at 108.
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the purpose of resolving an employee's grievance.5 7 It is arguable
that the union enjoys a similar statutory guarantee under PERA
section 447.301(4)."'
This statutory provision is subject to several possible interpre-
tations, however, including one that would give all employees,
members and nonmembers, the right to adjust grievances directly
with the employer all the way through arbitration. Whether PERC
correctly resolved this issue in Heath is addressed in the next sec-
tion of this article. 9 Assuming, however, that the Heath interpre-
tation is correct and that an employee does not have a right to
arbitrate individually, unless the certified bargaining agent has
first denied the employee representation, the meaning of PERA
section 447.301(4) is still open to question.
Arguably, the provision simply gives the employer discretion
to adjust an individual's grievance so long as the employer has not
bargained away that discretion in the collective agreement.6 0
Under this interpretation, 'section 447.301(4) protects employers
from unfair labor practice charges based on the doctrine of exclu-
sive representation."1 An employer can bargain away this protec-
tion, but in those circumstances in which the union allows the em-
ployee to proceed individually, the provision would guarantee the
bargaining agent the right to be present even during arbitration.
The plaintiff in Heath argued that section 447.301(4) goes be-
yond simply protecting employers by actually guaranteeing indi-
vidual employees the right to grieve and arbitrate.2 PERC rejected
this argument, analogizing the PERA provision to section 9(a) of
57. Such a clause was included in the collective agreement between AFSCME and the
State in the PBA case. Id. at 110 n.10.
58. Section 447.301(4) of the Florida Statutes states in pertinent part:
Nothing in this part shall be construed to prevent any public employee from
presenting, at any time, his own grievances, in person or by legal counsel, to his
public employer and having such grievances adjusted without the intervention of
the bargaining agent, if the adjustment is not inconsistent with the terms of the
collective bargaining agreement then in effect and if the bargaining agent has
been given reasonable opportunity to be present at any meeting called for the
resolution of such grievances.
59. See infra text accompanying notes 91-143.
60. This interpretation is based on an analogy between section 447.301(4) of the Florida
Statutes and the proviso to section 9(a) of the National Labor Relations Act. See Galbreath
v. School Bd., 9 FLA. L. WEEKLY 33, 34 (Sup. Ct. Jan. 26, 1984); Heath, [1979] 5 F.P.E.R. at
91-93; In re School Bd. of Leon County, [1981] 7 F.P.E.R. at 579.
61. Cf. Black-Clawson Co. v. International Ass'n of Machinists Lodge 355, 313 F.2d 179
(2d Cir. 1962) (the employee is not given an indefeasible right, mirrored in a duty on the
part of the employer, to have his grievances adjusted).
62. Heath, [1979] 5 F.P.E.R. at 90-92.
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the NLRA." In subsequent decisions, PERC has taken the posi-
tion that PERA section 447.301(4) applies only where employer
and employee attempt to adjust a grievance short of arbitration."
Under the latter interpretation, there is no specific provision that
defines the right of a certified bargaining agent to participate in a
nonmember's arbitration if it has declined representation of the
nonmember.
The balancing of the respective rights of the union and the
grievant in this situation requires consideration of the policies un-
derlying exclusive representation by the certified bargaining agent
and "fair and equitable" arbitration for a nonmember. The ques-
tion of what is "fair" to the grievant will arise when the bargaining
agent is more in agreement with the employer than with the indi-
vidual employee on an issue of contract interpretation. The arbi-
trator occupies a difficult position when the union and the em-
ployer agree. Under most collective bargaining agreements, the
union and the employer normally select arbitrators to settle dis-
putes arising under the collective agreement. While the individual
employee will participate in the selection of the arbitrator for the
grievance in question, the employee probably will not be in a posi-
tion to pick an arbitrator in the future. The arbitrator's incentives
are to please the union and the employer, who negotiated and
drafted the contract, and not to please the individual employee.
This structural characteristic of arbitration raises doubts about the
fairness of arbitration to the individual employee when all three
parties participate in the hearing.
6'
On the other hand, the certified bargaining agent should be
allowed to fulfill its obligation to advocate the interests of all em-
ployees in disputes over the meaning of specific contract clauses.66
The traditional solution to this dilemma is to require the union to
represent all employees and to deal with any issues of fairness
raised by the tension between the union and a nonmember later, if
63. Id. at 91-93.
64. Florida PBA v. State, [1982] 8 F.P.E.R. 13,059, at 109 (Jan. 13, 1982); see also
Answer Brief of Appellee at 34, Galbreath v. School Bd., 424 So. 2d 837 (Fla. 4th DCA
1982).
65. See Schatzki, Majority Rule, Exclusive Representation and the Interests of Indi-
vidual Workers: Should Exclusivity be Abolished?, 123 U. PA. L. REv. 897, 908 n.28 (1975);
Summers, supra note 1, at 402. It is also arguable that the procedures violate due process,
because an adjudicator with a pecuniary interest in the outcome of a case is constitutionally
unacceptable. See cases cited supra note 16. For a discussion of the due process issues, see
infra text accompanying notes 185-93.
66. Summers, supra note 1, at 395-97.
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and when the employee files fair representation charges. 67 This so-
lution is not available, however, in situations where the union is
allowed to deny representation to a nonmember. The most practi-
cal course is to maintain confidence in the integrity of arbitrators
and to presume that an arbitrator will decide every grievance on
its merits and will disregard how a decision will influence the arbi-
trator's chances of being selected in the future." If the individual
nonmember seeks judicial review of the arbitrator's award, how-
ever, the court should be sensitive to any indication of bias or un-
fairness in the proceedings.6"
The PBA decision creates an incentive for certified bargaining
agents to assume control of all grievances, irrespective of the griev-
ant's union membership, when a rival union is engaged in a cam-
paign to challenge the certified agent. Nevertheless, there may be
some tendency for the certified agent to turn down any questiona-
ble nonmember grievance on the ground that it lacks merit. Then,
the employee's only recourse is to file a duty of fair representation
action against the union.7 1 It will be very difficult for an employee
to carry the burden of proving bad faith by the union, even if the
employee's nonmembership was the reason for the union's denial
of representation, unless the union is required at least to provide
reasons for its refusal. The section on fair representation discusses
this issue in detail.7
1
A second alternative is for the bargaining agent to assume an
intermediate position. The certified bargaining agent might estab-
lish a fee schedule for the handling of nonmember grievances and
require the nonmember to grieve through the union and to pay the
costs instead of going forward individually. 7 The union can claim
67. See Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171 (1967).
68. Due process doctrine presumes the impartiality of an adjudicator; the party alleging
bias carries the burden of showing that the adjudicator has sufficient interest in the final
decision to overcome the presumption of impartiality. See Schweiker v. McClure, 456 U.S.
188 (1982); cf. Commonwealth Coatings Corp. v. Continental Casualty Co., 393 U.S. 145
(1968) (when arbitrators fail to disclose dealings that might create a bias, any award may be
vacated).
69. A second alternative is for PERC to use its rulemaking power to standardize proce-
dures for the selection of arbitrators in the case of a nonmember grieving individually.
These procedures could remove the taint of a structural bias against the nonmember. See
infra text accompanying notes 191-95.
70. Heath v. School Bd., [1979] 5 F.P.E.R. at 92-93; Galbreath v. Broward County
CTA, [1981] 7 F.P.E.R. 1 12,288 (June 26, 1981), affd, 424 So. 2d 837 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982),
aff'd, 9 FLA. L. WEEKLY 33 (Sup. Ct. Jan. 26, 1984).
71. See infra text accompanying notes 259-80.
72. Neither PERC nor the Florida courts have squarely faced the question whether a
certified agent can agree to process a grievance only if the nonmember pays costs, and if the
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that as a matter of labor policy it is preferable for the union to
fulfill its role as exclusive representative and to handle all em-
ployee grievances. To minimize the free-rider problem and main-
tain fairness to dues-paying members, however, the nonmember
should be required to reimburse the union for the costs of process-
ing his grievance.
The NLRB has rejected a similar line of reasoning, holding
that a requirement that an employee pay costs is a violation of the
union's duty of fair representation to the nonmember .7  These
cases are distinguishable, however, since a Florida public employee
who is not a union member is not entitled to representation by the
union as a matter of right.74 The real obstacle to the reimburse-
ment requirement is the right-to-work provision of the Florida
Constitution.7 5 A contract clause compelling non-union employees
to pay a pro rata share of the costs and expenses incurred by the
bargaining agent in establishing and administering the collective
bargaining agreement has been held violative of the right-to-work
provision. Yet payment of a fee for grievance processing can be
distinguished from the payment of the costs of collective bargain-
ing. The former is only a condition of the nonmember's access to
grievance procedures; it is not a condition of the employee's right
to employment. In addition, if the nonmember's grievance is suffi-
ciently serious to involve job security, an alternative statutory ap-
individual refuses, then preclude the nonmember from proceeding individually. The closest
case to this situation was Sherry v. United Teachers, 368 So. 2d 445 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979).
Marylou Sherry claimed the Dade County School Board violated the collective agreement
by failing to give her a job for which she was the best qualified candidate. She requested the
union to file a grievance. United Teachers of Dade agreed to proceed if she paid costs in
accordance with a "Service Fee Schedule" for nonmembers. Id. at 446-47. In response, Sher-
ry filed a court action, arguing that PERA section 447.401 is unconstitutional because it
allows a union to discriminate based on nonunion membership in violation of article I, sec-
tion 6 of the Florida Constitution. The Third District Court of Appeal dismissed the action
for lack of standing on the ground that Sherry's only complaint was that the union "would
not process her grievance free of charge." Id. at 447. The court concluded that because
Sherry could pay the fee or process the grievance herself, she lacked standing to challenge
section 447.401. Id. The court did not indicate whether its conclusion that she could proceed
on her own was based on the contract or on section 447.401 of PERA.
73. International Ass'n of Machinists Local 697, 223 NLRB 832 (1976); see also Inter-
national Union of the United Ass'n of Journeymen, Local 141 v. NLRB, 675 F.2d 1257 (D.C.
Cir. 1982) (Such a requirement was not a mandatory subject for bargaining).
74. FLA. STAT. § 447.401 (1983).
75. Article I, section 6 of the Florida Constitution provides: "The right of persons to
work shall not be denied or abridged on account of membership or non-membership in any
labor union or labor organization."
76. Florida Educ. Ass'n/United v. PERC, 346 So. 2d 551 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977); see also
Schermerhorn v. Retail Clerks Int'l Ass'n Local 1625, 141 So. 2d 269 (Fla. 1962).
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peal procedure normally is available.7
Florida's right-to-work cases reflect two responses to this argu-
ment. First, employment interests that fall short of those protected
by civil service statutes, but that are subject to contract grievance
procedures, are cognizable under article III, section 6 of the Flor-
ida Constitution./ Conditioning the protection of these interests
on a payment to the union is an abridgment of an employment
right on the basis of non-union membership. Second, to deny non-
members the same choice of procedures as is available to members,
unless the nonmember makes a payment to the union, is also an
abridgment of the right to work. Conditioning access to contract
grievance procedures on the payment of a fee to the bargaining
agent would therefore be a violation of the Florida Constitution
under existing precedent.
79
Florida's right-to-work decisions may also be used to argue
that the PERA amendment is itself unconstitutional."0 The
amendment distinguishes among employees on the basis of union
membership; it arguably operates to coerce employees into joining
the union to protect their job security through contract grievance
procedures. The best response to this argument is that the amend-
ment guarantees all employees equal access to arbitration, whether
or not they are represented by a certified bargaining agent."1 There
is no section 6 violation if the equal access requirement is met.
Bargaining agents and employers, or PERC through its rulemaking
powers, should establish fair contract grievance procedures to en-
able nonmembers to proceed on their own if their certified bar-
gaining agents refuse to represent them. 2 The employee should
have an opportunity to select his own representative, to follow nor-
mal grievance processing steps, to participate in the selection of an
arbitrator, and to pay no more than the normal union's share of
77. See FLA. CONST. art. III, § 14 (mandating a civil service system for state employees
and allowing counties and municipalities to establish their own systems).
78. FLA. CONST. art. I, § 6.
79. See cases cited supra note 76.
80. Two distinct lines of cases interpreting article I, section 6 of the Florida Constitu-
tion are relevant. The first is concerned with discrimination based on membership or non-
membership, which abridges a job interest. See cases cited supra note 76. The second line of
cases has interpreted the right-to-work provision as a guarantee that public employees must
enjoy the same rights to bargain as do private sector employees under the NLRA except for
the right to strike. See City of Tallahassee v. PERC, 410 So. 2d 487 (Fla. 1981); Dade
County Classroom Teachers Ass'n v. Ryan, 225 So. 2d 903 (Fla. 1969).
81. FLA. STAT. § 447.401 (1983).
82. For a discussion of PERC's rulemaking powers, which could be used to avoid due
process problems, see infra text accompanying notes 191-95.
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the arbitration costs. The grievance will cost more for the non-
member than for a member whom the union represents without
charge. This difference, however, reflects the members' payments
of dues, which spread the costs of grieving among all union mem-
bers. Employees will be encouraged to join unions to participate in
sharing grievance costs, but this incentive is inherent in a system
of collective bargaining. It is not an abridgment of the right to
work.
Another challenge to the the PERA amendment under the
Florida Constitution is based on those cases that have interpreted
section 6 as giving public employees the same rights to bargain col-
lectively as private sector employees enjoy, except for the right to
strike.83 Private employees have a statutory right to representation
by a certified bargaining agent both in bargaining and in contract
administration, without regard to membership or nonmembership
in the union.84 The PERA amendment eliminates nonmembers'
right to union representation in contract administration, thereby
creating a distinction between private and public sector employees
unrelated to the right to strike.
Two major cases have focused on the different treatment of
private and public sector employees. The Florida Supreme Court
held in Dade County Classroom Teachers' Association, Inc. v.
Ryan88 that public employees have a constitutional right to bar-
gain collectively because section 6 guarantees public employees the
same rights as those enjoyed by private sector employees, with the
exception of the right to strike. The Florida First District Court of
Appeal recently relied on Ryan in striking down as unconstitu-
tional a statutory prohibition on collective bargaining over retire-
ment benefits.86 In affirming the district court of appeal, the Flor-
ida Supreme Court distinguished between rigid legislative
prohibitions on the subject matter of bargaining and legislative ef-
forts to regulate the system of collective bargaining to reflect the
special needs of the public sector.87
In applying the court's reasoning to the PERA amendment
governing nonmember grievances, the issue becomes whether a cer-
83. See cases cited supra note 80.
84. Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171 (1967); Steele v. Louisville & N.R.R., 323 U.S. 192
(1944).
85. 225 So. 2d 903 (Fla. 1969).
86. City of Tallahassee v. PERC, 393 So. 2d 1147 (Fla. 1st DCA), alf'd, 410 So. 2d 487
(Fla. 1981).
87. City of Tallahassee v. PERC, 410 So. 2d 487, 490-91 (1981).
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tified union's right to refuse to grieve for a nonmember constitutes
a reasonable effort by the Florida legislature to structure grievance
procedures that reflect the special needs of the public sector. The
tendency of public sector employees to decide against union mem-
bership is greater than that of private sector employees. Civil ser-
vice laws and similar statutes provide a substantial degree of job
security for public employees. Public sector bargaining units are
often very large, so there is less sense of group solidarity. More-
over, public employees cannot strike. Grieving for nonmembers can
be a substantial drain on the resources of a union with a lower
percentage of dues-paying members. The bargaining agent's option
whether to represent nonmembers in grievances relieves it of some
financial pressure; at the same time it leaves the agent in a posi-
tion to control grievances that are important to the collective. The
practical problems that unions face in representing public sector
employees in a right-to-work state explain the distinction between
the statutory duties of public and private sector bargaining agents.
So long as the statute's interpretation gives non-union members
equal access to grievance arbitration, albeit at their own expense, it
does not violate employee rights guaranteed by section 6.
3. DENIAL OF A NONMEMBER'S GRIEVANCE ON THE MERITS
Heath involved a non-union member who never asked the bar-
gaining agent to represent him in processing his grievance. That
case left unresolved the situation in which a nonmember asks the
union to proceed to arbitration, and the union declines to proceed
on the ground that the grievance lacks merit.
PERC addressed this issue in In re School Board of Leon
County."8 In a school district with two unions locked in a struggle
over representation, the school board asked for clarification of this
issue when the certified bargaining agent denied a nonmember's
grievance because it lacked merit. PERC, citing Heath and Leon
County CTA, declared that the public employer could refuse to
arbitrate. PERC emphasized (a) the increased costs public employ-
ers and taxpayers would face if individual employees could take
their own grievances to arbitration; (b) the destructive impact on
collective bargaining of a public employer dealing directly with an
individual employee; (c) the danger of a disgruntled employee us-
88. [19811 7 F.P.E.R. at 12,286 (June 26, 1981). PERC's opinion in this case provided
the basis for the Florida Supreme Court's opinion in Galbreath v. School Bd., 9 FLA. L.
WEEKLY 33 (Sup. Ct. Jan. 26, 1984).
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ing grievances to harass the union and the employer; and (d) the
potential for a rival union to use the grievance process to upset
collective bargaining with the certified agent.89 Under this decision,
if the nonmember suspects that the real reason for the union's de-
nial of the grievance is the nonmember's refusal to join the certi-
fied union or his support for a rival union, the employee's only.
remedy is to file an unfair representation charge against the certi-
fied union.90
B. Exclusive Representation and PERA: An Issue of Statutory
Interpretation
1. A COMPARISON OF PERA AND THE NLRA
There is a solid statutory argument that PERC was wrong in
Heath to rely on private sector precedent in interpreting PERA. In
fact, the first Florida court to discuss the issue commented in dicta
that it was more in agreement with the dissenting commissioner in
Heath than with the majority.9' More recently, the Florida Su-
preme Court upheld the reasoning of PERC on this issue in Gal-
breath v. School Bd.
92
The heart of the dissenting commissioner's argument is that
PERA should be interpreted consistently with its own language
and structure and not simply as a mirror image of the NLRA.95
There are significant differences between the two statutes. First,
the amendment to section 447.401 can be seen as a legislative re-
jection of the principle of exclusive representation in the area of
grievance arbitration.9 Second, PERA statutorily mandates arbi-
89. In re School Bd. of Leon County, [1981] 7 F.P.E.R. at 580.
90. Id., see Galbreath v. Broward County Classroom Teacher's Ass'n, [1981] 7 F.P.E.R.
12,288 (June 26, 1981), af'd, 424 So. 2d 837 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982) afj'd, 9 FLA. L. WEEKLY
33 (Sup. Ct. Jan. 26, 1984).
91. Duval County School Bd. v. Duval Teachers United Local 3326, 393 So. 2d 1151,
1152 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981).
92. The exact issue certified was as follows:
Where the certified bargaining agent retains contractual control over the arbitral
step of the grievance procedure and it declines to process a grievance to arbitra-
tion because it believes the grievance to be without merit, is the public employer
still obligated to arbitrate the dispute if the grievant submits it to arbitration
because the certified bargaining agent has declined to "represent the grievant?"
The Florida Supreme Court affirmed, adopting as its opinion PERC's reasoning in In re
Leon County School Board, 7 F.P.E.R. 1 12,286 (1981). Galbreath v. School Bd., 9 FLA. L.
WEEKLY 33 (Sup. Ct. Jan. 26, 1984). For a discussion of the opinion see infra note 260.
93. Heath v. School Bd., [1979] 5 F.P.E.R. V 10,074, at 94-96 (Mar. 20, 1979) (Parish,
Comm'r, dissenting).
94. See 1977 Fla. Laws ch. 77-343, § 14 (codified at FLA. STAT § 447.401 (1983)).
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tration. Under the NLRA the procedure exists by mutual consent
of the parties. 5 Third, section 447.301(4), which deals with the
public employee's access to his employer to present a grievance, is
part of a section enumerating fundamental employee rights.9 6 The
language of section 447.301(4) is similar to that of the proviso to
section 9(a) of the NLRA, but the purpose of the NLRA proviso is
to clarify exclusive representation; it is not a part of NLRA section
7 on fundamental employee rights. 7 Fourth, the NLRA does not
specifically provide that it is an unfair labor practice for an em-
ployer to violate the employee's right to present an individual
grievance.96 By contrast, PERA section 447.501(f) makes it an un-
fair labor practice for a public employer to refuse to discuss a
95. Federal labor law favors the resolution of contract grievances through final and
binding arbitration, but the doctrine developed through court cases to enforce arbitration
clauses in collective agreements rather than by statutory mandate. See United Steelworkers
v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960); United Steelworkers v. Warrior &
Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960); United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363
U.S. 564 (1960). In contrast, section 447.401 of PERA does mandate arbitration in all Flor-
ida public sector collective agreements as follows:
All public employees shall have the right to a fair and equitable grievance proce-
dure, administered without regard to membership or nonmembership in any or-
ganization, except that certified employee organizations shall not be required to
process grievances for employees who are not members of the organization. A
career service employee shall have the option of utilizing the civil service appeal
procedures or a grievance procedure established under this section, but such em-
ployee cannot use both a civil service appeal and a grievance procedure.
FLA. STAT. § 447.401 (1983).
96. For the text of section 447.301(4), see supra note 58.
97. National Labor Relations Act, Pub. L. No. 198, §§ 7, 9(a), 49 Stat. 449, 452-53
(1935) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 157, 159(a) (1976)). The text of section 9(a), as
amended, is as follows:
Representatives designated or selected for the purposes of collective bargaining
by the majority of the employees in a unit appropriate for such purposes, shall
be the exclusive representatives of all the employees in such unit for the pur-
poses of collective bargaining in respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of employ-
ment, or other conditions of employment: Provided, That any individual em-
ployee or a group of employees shall have the right at any time to present
grievances to their employer and to have such grievances adjusted, without the
intervention of the bargaining representative, as long as the adjustment is not
inconsistent with the terms of a collective-bargaining contract or agreement then
in effect: Provided further, That the bargaining representative has been given
opportunity to be present at such adjustment.
29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1976).
For the view that the proviso simply protects an employer who voluntarily discusses a
grievance with an employee from a charge of bypassing the bargaining agent, see Black-
Clawson Co. v. International Ass'n of Machinists Lodge 355, 313 F.2d 179 (2d Cir. 1962).
98. In an influential article on the rights of employees under the NLRA, Professor Cox
relies on the lack of such an enforcement provision to justify his statutory argument that
the proviso to section 9(a) does not create affirmative rights. See Cox, Rights Under a Labor
Agreement, 69 HARv. L. REv. 601, 624 (1956).
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grievance with "either the certified bargaining agent for the public
employee or the employee involved." ' 9
The enactment of the two laws also occurred within the con-
text of distinct legal environments for individual employee rights.
Prior to the NLRA, the "employment at will" doctrine governed
employment relations in the private sector.""0 An employer had no
obligation to listen to the grievance of any employee. NLRA sec-
tion 8(a)(5), combined with section 9(a), created a statutory obliga-
tion of the employer to listen and respond in good faith to griev-
ances presented by the union.' 0 ' The proviso to section 9(a) simply
retained the employer's discretion to listen to an individual em-
ployee's grievance in situations not involving the union. This is an
exception to the employer's normal obligation to deal only with the
union; it is therefore a proviso to the exclusive representation prin-
ciple. This proviso did not obligate the employer to listen to an
individual employee, and the employer remained free to bargain
away this discretion. 102
99. FLA. STAT. § 447.50i(1)(f) (1983).
100. For an interesting historical perspective on the employment at will doctrine, see
Feinman, The Development of the Employment at Will Rule, 20 AM. J. LGAL HIST. 118
(1976).
101. National Labor Relations Act, Pub. L. No. 1981 §§ 8(a)(5), 9(a), 49 Stat. 453, 453
(1935) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 158(c)(5), 159(a) (1976)).
102. There were initially two contrary views as to the proviso's meaning. Compare Cox,
supra note 98 with Summers, supra note 1. Several early decisions interpreted the proviso
as creating a statutory right of an employee to utilize contract grievance procedures through
arbitration even if the union did not support the employee's claim and had refused to take
the grievance to arbitration. The union had the right to be present throughout the proce-
dures to protect collective interests, but as long as the employee was willing to bear his
share of the arbitration cost, he could go forward. See Donnelly v. United Fruit Co., 40 N.J.
61, 190 A.2d 825 (1963); Pattenge v. Wagner Iron Works, 275 Wis. 495, 82 N.W.2d 172
(1957); see also Summers, supra note 1, at 366-67. The alternative view was that the pur-
pose of the proviso was only to modify exclusive representation from the perspective of the
employer and not of individual employees. If an individual employee wished to present a
grievance to his employer without going through the union, the proviso enabled an em-
ployer, at his option, to hear and adjust the grievance without being charged with an unfair
labor practice for violating the doctrine of exclusive representation. Under this interpreta-
tion, the employer could bargain away this option by a clause in the collective agreement
and could refuse to deal with any employee not represented by the union. See Black-Claw-
son Co. v. International Ass'n of Machinists Lodge 355, 313 F.2d 179 (2d Cir. 1962); see also
Cox, supra note 98, at 624. Eventually the interpretation advocated by Professor Cox be-
came the accepted interpretation of the proviso. See Emporium Capwell Co. v. Western
Addition Community Org., 420 U.S. 50, 61 n.12 (1975); Black-Clawson Co. v. International
Ass'n of Machinists Lodge 355, 313 F.2d 179, 184-85 (2d Cir. 1962). Professor Cox's princi-
pal points in the interpretation of section 9(a) were as follows:
First, interpretation of a proviso is in the light of the basic policy it modifies, in this
case exclusive representation. Since exclusive representation is a constraint on the employer,
in the sense of forcing the employer to deal with the union rather than with individual
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By contrast, the enactment of PERA occurred in the context
of a highly developed body of constitutional and statutory law rec-
ognizing in individual public employees a limited property right in
their jobs."'3 State civil service laws have created individual em-
ployee expectancies about job security. The individual employee
may not be deprived of these expectancies without due process of
law."0' In this context, the recognition of an individual employee's
right to grieve under section 447.301(4) is more consistent with the
prior legal doctrine governing public employee rights than with the
private sector doctrine that individual employees have no right to
grieve.
The majority opinion in Heath does not really confront these
issues of statutory interpretation.10 5 PERC simply pointed to the
similarity in language between PERA section 447.301(4) and
NLRA section 9(a), and concluded that the Florida legislature
would not have adopted that language had they not intended the
Florida statute to have the same meaning as the NLRA proviso.106
PERC emphasized the critical role played by exclusive representa-
tion in the private sector model of collective bargaining and the
need to preserve the same principle in the public sector. And al-
though PERC relied heavily on Vaca v. Sipes, it did not discuss
the relevancy of the policies underlying Vaca to public sector
employees, the proviso simply modifies the employer's obligation.
Second, employees never had a right to take a grievance to an employer. The basic
common law doctrine governing employment relations was employment at will. An employer
could always refuse to listen to the grievance of an individual employee without any fear of
legal action outside of the collective bargaining context. Congress, therefore, was assuming
that this basic legal principle would continue to govern, except for the employer's statutory
obligation to bargain in good faith, which includes an obligation to respond to grievances
presented by the union.
Third, Congress would not have created an individual statutory right of such signifi-
cance without including a provision in the statute for its enforcement. When amending sec-
tion 9(a) by the Taft-Hartley Act, Congress did not add any language to emphasize the right
of an individual employee to grieve. Cox, supra note 98, at 624.
103. See Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341 (1976); Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134 (1974);
Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593 (1972); Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972).
104. Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134 (1974); Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593 (1972);
Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972); cf. Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S.
422 (1982) (grievance procedures must survive due process and equal protection
considerations).
105. See Heath v. School Bd., [1979] 5 F.P.E.R. 110,074, at 94-96 (Mar. 20, 1979) (Par-
ish, Comm'r, dissenting).
106. Id. at 92; see also In re School Bd. of Leon County, [1981] 7 F.P.E.R. V 12,286, at





Perhaps the most significant difference between the two stat-
utes is in the underlying reasons for their enactment. The Wagner
Act reflected the economic policies of the Roosevelt administra-
tion; public sector collective bargaining statutes were primarily a
response to the first amendment rights of public employees to as-
sociate freely and to petition the government.108 While constitu-
tional doctrine does not compel the government to bargain with an
association of employees,10 9 it is unrealistic and disruptive of labor
relations for a public employer to ignore a union's existence. Public
107. See Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171 (1967). The Court in Vaca relied heavily on con-
cepts of collective bargaining set forth by Professor Cox. See Cox, supra note 1; Cox, supra
note 98. Subsequent to Vaca Professor Feller more fully elaborated these concepts into a
general theory of collective bargaining. See Feller, supra note 1.
Professor Cox draws on an analogy between collective bargaining and self-rule through
local government. He regards the collective agreement as a basic statute that establishes a
set of rules to govern the work place. Private arbitration is a neutral dispute resolution
process to resolve questions about the meaning of the rules in particular cases. Over time,
arbitration creates a common law of the shop that guides the parties in resolving problems
and legitimizes the rules and their application. Cox, supra note 1, at 1499-500; see also
Feller, supra note 1. Management participates in the formulation of the rules through the
hierarchy of the firm, and employees participate through the union. Exclusive representa-
tion maintains the system's stablility by forcing employees to resolve their conflicts within
the union. The presumption is that employees speak with a united voice through their ex-
clusive representative. The union is the focal point for institutionalizing group rights and
vesting power in an ongoing group representative on whom the employer can rely to help
establish and enforce a rational set of work rules. Feller, supra note 1, at 718-24. The collec-
tive has an interest in the way all disputes are presented to an arbitrator because of the
impact of arbitration decisions on the future adjustment of grievances for employees simi-
larly situated. Union control over access to arbitration enables the union to negotiate early
settlements when similar disputes have been resolved by arbitration in the past and to elim-
inate frivolous grievances. Arbitration is not overburdened; the costs of dispute resolution
for both the union and the employer are kept at a reasonable level; and solidarity of the
union is strengthened. A strong union is more able to control members and to aid the em-
ployer in rationalizing the bureaucratic structure of the firm through rules established by
the collective agreement. This leads to more stable labor relations and industrial peace. Cox,
supra note 98, at 625. See generally Feller, supra note 1.
The analogy to a system of local government assumes all unit employees will participate
in the political life of the union by electing the leadership responsible for formulation of
union policies. In a right-to-work state, employees who do not join the union present a prob-
lem for the model of industrial pluralism. In addition, the bill of rights for union members,
enacted as part of the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959 (Landrum-
Griffin Act), does not apply to unions organizing a state entity, so many public sector em-
ployees do not enjoy the same formal guarantees- of internal union democracy. Pub. L. No.
86-257, §§ 3(i), 101, 73 Stat. 519, 520-22 (codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 402(i), 411 (1976)).
108. NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963); Eastern R.R. Presidents Conference v.
Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127 (1961).
109. Smith v. Arkansas State Highway Employees, 441 U.S. 463, 465 n.2 (1979) (citing
Hanover Township Fed'n of Teachers Local 1954 v. Hanover Community School Corp., 457
F.2d 456, 461 (7th Cir. 1972)).
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sector bargaining statutes were a practical accommodation to the
fact that public employees could not be prohibited from forming
unions. 110 The NLRA, by contrast, was an effort to improve em-
ployee working conditions and wages by encouraging
unionization.1"
The history of the Florida statute illustrates this distinction
between the two statutes. The right-to-work provision of the Flor-
ida Constitution guarantees individual employees the freedom to
decide whether to join without fear of losing their jobs.1 2 It also
prohibits any abridgment of their right to bargain through a union.
When Florida's public employees began to organize, the Florida
Supreme Court interpreted this latter provision as the source of a
constitutional right to bargain.1" 3 In effect, the state supreme court
directed the legislature to enact a statute that would regulate bar-
gaining or risk judicial imposition of an equivalent doctrine on a
case-by-case basis.
1 4
The legislature responded by enacting PERA, which empha-
sized the need for "cooperative relationships between government
and its employees" in order to assure the uninterrupted operation
of government." s The preamble explicitly states, "Nothing herein
shall be construed either to encourage or discourage organization
of public employees." 1 6 Stable labor relations were a central objec-
tive of both the NLRA and PERA, but fostering unionization was
not a goal of the latter act.
In summary, PERA and the NLRA are different in many re-
110. McLaughlin v. Tilendis, 398 F.2d 287 (7th Cir. 1968); Melton v. City of Atlanta,
324 F.Supp. 315 (M.D. Ga. 1971); Atkins v. City of Charlotte, 296 F. Supp. 1068 (W.D.N.C.
1969).
111. Section 1 of the NLRA states in the congressional "Findings and Policies" that
inequality of bargaining power created by obstacles to the organization of unions depresses
wages, prevents the stabilization of working conditions, and contributes to industrial strife.
The purpose of the Act was to eliminate the obstacles "by encouraging the practice and
procedure of collective bargaining and by protecting the exercise by workers of full freedom
of association, self-organization, and designation of representatives of their own choosing,
for the purpose of negotiating the terms and conditions of their employment or other mu-
tual aid or protection." 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
112. FLA. CONST. art I, § 6.
113. See Dade County Classroom Teachers' Ass'n v. Ryan, 225 So. 2d 903 (Fla. 1969).
114. Dade County Classroom Teachers' Ass'n v. Legislature, 269 So. 2d 684 (Fla. 1972).
The teachers' union filed a petition for a writ of mandamus asking the Florida Supreme
Court to compel the legislature to enact guidelines regulating public employee rights to bar-
gain collectively. The court denied the petition, but it did warn the legislature to take action
within a reasonable time or the court would develop the guidelines itself.




spects: (a) statutory structure and language, (b) prior common law
and statutory doctrine governing individual employee rights and
job security, and (c) legislative purpose. None of these differences
provides a definitive answer to the question whether there should
be a distinct balance between individual employee rights and col-
lective control over contract issues under PERA. They do, how-
ever, suggest that it is important to understand more fully the in-
terests affected by the policy choice. The basic issue is whether the
needs of public sector collective bargaining justify exclusive union
control over access by individual employees to an impartial hearing
through contract grievance procedures. The resolution of this issue
involves striking a balance among the interests of the public em-
ployer, the union, the collective employees in a bargaining unit,
and the individual employee.
2. POLICY JUSTIFICATIONS FOR EXCLUSIVE UNION CONTROL OVER
GRIEVANCES
a. The public employer's interest
Public agencies are concerned with delivering quality public
services at reasonable cost to taxpayers. Harmonious labor rela-
tions contribute to this goal; a union's status as exclusive represen-
tative in both collective bargaining and grievance procedures helps
to stabilize labor relations in a number of ways.
PERA normally certifies the largest possible bargaining unit to
minimize the cost of bargaining and to enable public employers to
establish standardized working conditions for large groups of em-
ployees through collective agreements. 17 Large bargaining units
entail a geographical dispersion of employees in the same unit and
diversity in the types of jobs the bargaining unit employees per-
form. These differences may cause employees to coalesce into sub-
groups that share interests not common to the unit as a whole;
exclusive representation precludes those subgroups from dealing
directly with the employer. Conflicts of interest among employees
are internalized within the union, and the employer avoids being
117. Traditionally PERC has favored "wall-to-wall" units as the most appropriate in
order to avoid fragmentation. See Amalgamated Transit Union v. City of Tallahassee,
[1980] 6 F.P.E.R. $ 11,124 (May 14, 1980). More recently the Commission has departed
somewhat from the insistence on "wall-to-wall" units when the larger unit might disrupt
rather than foster efficient public administration and stable labor relations. See Amalga-
mated Transit Union, Local 1579 v. City of Gainesville, [1982] 8 F.P.E.R. 13,064 (:Jan. 14,
1982); Hillaborough County Gov't Employees Ass'n v. Hillsborough County Emergency
Medical Servs., [19811 7 F.P.E.R. 1 12,350 (Aug. 24, 1981).
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caught in the middle of competing employee demands. Because the
union is a political entity controlled by the majority of employees,
it faces the task of adjusting competing interests and presenting a
united front to the employer.
Exclusive representation also makes it more difficult for a rival
union to gain support, challenge the certified agent, and disrupt
the existing working relationships between the employer and the
certified union. As exclusive representative, the certified union
controls most avenues of access to the employer, including griev-
ance procedures to which the employer has agreed by contract.118
A rival union has almost no means available to demonstrate its
representational skills to disenchanted employees. This conse-
quence deters rival campaigns, and certified unions enjoy greater
discretion in determining bargaining demands and in deciding
whether to press employee grievances to arbitration. The more se-
cure a union's status as exclusive representative, the more politi-
cally feasible it will be for the certified union to refuse to process
weak grievances.
This discussion demonstrates that exclusive representation
contributes to the strength of a certified union, but the issue from
the public employer's perspective is whether it is more advanta-
geous to deal with a strong or with a weak union. So long as the
union obeys the legal prohibition against strikes, the employer may
prefer a strong union. A strong union can contribute to the legiti-
macy of work rules among employees, aid in administration of
work rules by using grievances to help control abuses of discretion
by supervisory personnel, and minimize the time employers must
devote to frivolous complaints by employees. In addition, the
union shares the cost of grieving under a contract, including the
cost of arbitration if it is necessary. The public normally would
bear the financial burden of adjusting employee complaints
through civil service or statutory appeal procedures.
Even more important from a financial perspective is the sav-
ings of public funds that result from the union's power to end un-
meritorious grievances early and to settle other grievances for less
than the full relief an individual employee has demanded. If indi-
vidual employees had the right to force the employer into arbitra-
tion, disgruntled employees or rival unions could exploit this, and
118. The bargaining agent and the employer cannot prohibit individual employees from
using any forum that is available to the general public in order to address the public em-
ployer on issues that are also the subject of collective bargaining. See City of Madison Joint
School Dist. No. 8 v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Comm'n, 429 U.S. 167 (1976).
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the result would be an increase in the cost of administering collec-
tive agreements.
A public employer might also prefer a strong union because it
is easier for the public employer to maintain consistency on issues
of contract interpretation. The employer and the union draft the
collective agreement. They may intentionally leave some clauses
vague, with the understanding that the specific meaning of these
clauses will be determined later through handling concrete griev-
ances. The employer and the union understand each other's posi-
tions on the issues and the bargaining history of the wording of the
contract. Negotiating settlements of contract grievances is thus in-
timately related to negotiating the contract itself. The introduction
of either an individual employee or a rival union into grievance
handling may disrupt this ongoing development of rules to govern
the work place.
There are, of course, counter-considerations as well as other
ways to protect many concerns of employers, while giving individ-
ual employees more control over their individual grievances. Some
of these alternatives are described below in the discussion of the
interests of the collective and of individual employees.119
b. The union's interests
It is important to differentiate between the interests of unions
engaged in the business of organizing and representing employees
and the collective interests of employees. 12 0 The union depends on
119. See infra text accompanying notes 129-42.
120. There is an argument that this distinction is false. Labor laws are based on a sys-
tem of majoritarian principles. A majority of employees in a unit selects a union as their
representative. The majority's choice binds them. See NLRA § 9, 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1976).
The leaders of the union must be elected democratically. Landrum-Griffin Act §§ 101(a)1,
401, 29 U.S.C. §§ 411(a)(1), 481 (1976). If these leaders do not act according to the interests
of a majority of the employees (the collective), then they can be voted out of office. In this
sense, the union leadership is simply a reflection of the collective. See Freed, Polsby &
Spitzer, supra note 7, at 481 n.50.
This approach ignores the reality that international unions, operating on a national
scale, also have their own self-interests, which the unions pursue when they engage in the
organization of a specific bargaining unit. Considerations that go beyond the interests of a
majority of employees in a specific bargaining unit may become an integral part of the goals
that the union leadership pursues in its representational capacity. This may mean that the
union will act in pursuit of the interests of the majority in order to perpetuate its position as
exclusive representative, but the leadership's self-interest as well as the interests of the em-
ployees motivates them. See Red Ball Motor Freight, Inc., 157 NLRB 1237 (1966), enforced,
379 F.2d 137 (D.C. Cir. 1967); Barton Brands, Ltd. v. NLRB, 529 F.2d 793 (7th Cir. 1976). A
union will be concerned about the majoritarian interests of employees who they represent in
multiple bargaining units. This representation creates a potential conflict between a specific
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dues for its economic survival. Since Florida has interpreted its
constitutional right-to-work provision as precluding both agency
shops and fair-share agreements, employees are free to choose not
to join the union.' Nonmembers have a free ride as to both bar-
gaining and processing of grievances, unless the certified union ex-
ercises its option in Florida of refusing to process the grievances of
nonmembers.1
22
Exclusive control over grievances is a major factor in a union's
ability to overcome the free-rider problem. 23 As noted earlier, it is
unlikely that the Florida courts would allow a union to set a fee
schedule for processing nonmembers' grievances or to deny non-
members access to arbitration unless they use the union ,and pay
the fee.124 But schedules do exist, and the fee required for handling
a grievance normally is considerably greater than the yearly
dues. 12 For employees who would not otherwise join the union,
union membership is a form of insurance against the possibility of
a grievance.
As PERC defined it in Heath, exclusive union control creates
other incentives to join the union in addition to the lowering of the
cost of grieving. The nonmember must ask the union to grieve on
his behalf, and the union has the option to proceed or to tell the
nonmember to grieve on his own.' If the union agrees to grieve
for the employee, the nonmember faces representation by a union
with whom he is in tension. He is aware that the union has consid-
erable discretion to deny the grievance as unmeritorious, to settle
it for less than the relief the employee feels is appropriate, or to
devote minimal effort to preparing his case for arbitration. If the
union takes any of these approaches, the employee's only recourse
bargaining unit and the union membership in general. For example, the union may demand
better contract terms from an employer who is unable to pay the higher labor costs de-
manded and still remain in business. Nevertheless, the union may persist in order to protect
the area standard wages paid by more capital-intensive employers and thereby put the em-
ployer out of business and the employees out of work. See, e.g., United Mine Workers v.
Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 (1965).
121. Schermerhorn v. Retail Clerks Int'l Ass'n Local 1625, 141 So. 2d 269 (Fla. 1962);
Florida Educ. Ass'n/United v. PERC, 346 So. 2d 551 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977).
122. See FLA. STAT. § 447.401 (1983).
123. See Mack & Singer, Florida Public Employees: Is the Solution to the Free Rider
Problem Worse than the Problem Itself?, 6 FLA. ST. U.L. REv. 1347 (1978).
124. See supra text accompanying notes 72-78.
125. Cf. Sherry v. United Teachers, 368 So. 2d 445 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979) (nonmember
declined to pay fee to union to process grievance on her behalf in accordance with a fee
schedule).
126. Heath v. School Bd., [1979] 5 F.P.E.R. 10,074 (Mar. 20, 1979).
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is to file a duty of fair representation charge with PERC or to
bring a lawsuit based on the same theory.12 7 In either proceeding,
the employee bears the burden under current law of proving that
the union acted in bad faith because of the employee's nonmem-
bership. 2 ' Because the union's antagonism will normally be im-
plicit rather than explicit, bad faith must be inferred from circum-
stantial evidence. Either type of legal action has a fairly low
probability of success. In addition, instituting legal actions is costly
to the employee in terms of attorneys' fees and the personal cost of
additional tension with union supporters at work. Unless the em-
ployee feels strongly about his right to refuse to join a union, the
easiest course when he encounters a problem is to join the union
and have the union grieve.
If the nonmember supports a rival union, he has a legitimate
concern about the certified agent's handling of his grievance. The
certified union has an incentive to control the nonmember's griev-
ance in order to keep the rival union from using the grievance pro-
cedures to gain support among bargaining unit employees. At the
same time, the certified union's position is antagonistic to that of
the individual who supports the rival union. Unless the grievance
is one that has implications for a group of employees, the certified
bargaining agent has little incentive to do more than a minimally
effective job of representing the nonmember grievant. Exclusive
control prevents rival unions from using grievances to gain sup-
port, undermines the incentive for employees to join a rival organi-
zation, and increases membership in the certified union.
c. The collective's interests
The most obvious collective interest in grievance procedures is
contract interpretation, or the application of contract clauses to
specific situations that may have an impact on the union's and the
employer's adjustment of similar grievances in the future. Arbitra-
tion decisions create a common law of the workplace that influ-
ences the contract rights of all employees. 2 e
The collective interest in contract interpretation is the classi-
cal justification for union control of individual employees' griev-
ances, but the importance of union control varies with the nature
127. Galbreath v. Broward County Classroom Teachers' Ass'n, [1981] 7 F.P.E.R.
12,288 (June 26, 1981), aff'd 424 So. 2d 837 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982), aff'd, 9 FLA. L. WEE.KLY 33
(Sup. Ct. Jan. 26, 1984).
128. Id. at 583.
129. Cox, supra note 1.
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of the grievance. To the extent that a grievance involves disputed
facts, as discharge cases often do, the grievance is less important in
providing precedent under the contract. At the other end of the
spectrum are situations involving the application of a contract
clause, to undisputed facts that are likely to occur more often.
It is obvious that the collective has an interest in any arbitra-
tion going beyond the level of a dispute over facts, but it is not
clear that control over grievance procedures is necessary to protect
that interest. An alternative is to allow the certified agent to par-
ticipate in all steps of the grievance procedures, including arbitra-
tion, while allowing the employee to choose his own representative
if he so desires. 80 Giving employees the option of selecting their
own representatives would enable the union to avoid being caught
in a conflict of interests between the collective and the individual
employee. The union could argue in support of the interpretation
favorable to most employees and at the same time allow the indi-
vidual to argue his own case, whether or not it is consistent with
the union's position.
This approach may be a sensible compromise between the in-
terests of the collective and those of the individual, but it creates
problems for the union and the employer. The individual may
choose someone identified with a rival organization as his represen-
tative. ' In addition, this approach allows interest conflicts among
subgroups of employees or between the collective and an individual
to emerge through grievance procedures, with the employer caught
in the middle. It maximizes the free association choices of individ-
uals, which is consistent with the first amendment concerns under-
lying public sector bargaining, but it undermines harmonious labor
relations by encouraging rival unions.3 2
Allowing individual representation also undermines union soli-
darity by encouraging individuals or dissenting subgroups to use
grievance procedures to deal directly with employers. The collec-
tive's interest in solidarity, however, is unclear. If public sector un-
ions depended on the threat of a strike to win concessions, then
maintaining solidarity would be a central interest of the collective.
130. See Summers, supra note 1, at 399-404; Note, Individual Control Over Personal
Grievances Under Vaca v. Sipes, 77 YALE L.J. 559 (1968).131. See, e.g., Heath v. School Bd., [1979] 5 F.P.E.R. 10,074 (Mar. 20, 1979); Florida
PBA v. State, [1982] 8 F.P.E.R. 13,059 (Jan. 13, 1982).
132. See Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 191 (1967). For an argument that the threat of
rival unions disrupting the grievance process is not as serious as the Supreme Court as-
sumed in Vaca, see Note, supra note 130, at 568-70.
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Because public sector strikes are illegal, solidarity is a more impor-
tant factor in maintaining the union as a political force in cam-
paigns for the election or defeat of public officials with whom the
union negotiates. The importance of solidarity is not so evident in
maintaining union strength for collective bargaining.
The collective does share the union's interests in discouraging
free riders and in avoiding the use of union resources to finance
frivolous grievances. The certification of a union depends upon re-
ceiving the votes of a majority of the employees. Presumably they
will become members and pay dues. Policies that encourage mem-
bership and discourage unnecessary expenses make more funds
available to support bargaining and meritorious grievances.
d. The individual's interests
The interests of the individual grievant are in tension. As a
member of the collective, the individual shares with other employ-
ees the group's concern over the development of the common law
of the contract. As a member of the bargaining unit, he benefits
from employee support for the union and the dues used to bargain
and administer the contract. On the other hand, he enjoys a first
amendment right to associate with any employee group of his
choice or to refuse to join any union."'3 Under the Florida Consti-
tution, if he feels that a rival union would be a more effective ad-
vocate of his interests and those of his fellow employees, he has a
right to join and support that union without adverse consequences
to his job security.34 Similarly, he has the right to refuse to associ-
ate with any union and to remain secure in the knowledge that his
employment will not be affected by his decision.
An employee expects to enjoy the benefits listed in the con-
tract; he does not expect to be disciplined or discharged without
just cause. If he feels that the state has erroneously deprived him
of his job security in violation of the contract, he expects to have
an opportunity to be heard through the grievance procedures spec-
ified in the contract and in PERA section 447.401.3 The employee
133. See cases cited supra note 110. For a discussion of the difference under the first
amendinent between compelling employees to pay their fair share of union bargaining costs
and compelling union membership, see Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209 (1977).
134. FLA. CONST. art. I, § 6.
135. Section 447.401 of the Florida Statutes provides in relevant part:
Each public employer and bargaining agent shall negotiate a grievance proce-
dure to be used for the settlement of disputes between employer and employee,
or group of employees, involving the interpretation or application of a collective
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has an interest in being adequately represented throughout the
grievance procedures and in avoiding any adverse impact on his
representation as a result of his nonmembership in the union. Of
course, if he is a nonmember, he knows PERA allows the union to
refuse to represent him. In that case, he must grieve through a rep-
resentative of his own choice and bear his share of the arbitration
costs., 1
In most situations seriously threatening a Florida public em-
ployee's job security, the employee has other ways of challenging
the state's action. If he is a civil servant, he has a statutory right to
choose between civil service appeal procedures and contract griev-
ance procedures.3  The union may not bargain away this option.38
Rather than follow contract grievance procedures, school teachers
have the option of challenging discharges by pursuing statutory
procedures through the administrative hierarchy ending with the
state superintendent of schools."3 '
The alternative statutory appeal procedures vary in the type
of impartial hearings they provide. Civil service boards are nor-
mally independent of the specific government agency whose ac-
tions are being appealed, but the employees have no direct voice in
the selection of board members.14 0 For those employees not cov-
ered by civil service, the appeal procedures lead the employee to
higher levels in the same agency.14 1 There will not be direct con-
flicts of interest, however, between the employee and the specific
officials hearing the statutory appeal.
The statutory appeal procedures reflect concern for political
bargaining agreement. Such grievance procedure shall have as its terminal step a
final and binding disposition by an impartial neutral, mutually selected by the
parties.
136. Florida PBA v. State, [1982] 8 F.P.E.R. V 13,059 (Jan. 13, 1982).
137. FLA. STAT. § 447.401 (1983).
138. PERC v. District School Bd. of DeSoto County, 374 So. 2d 1005-15 (Fla. 2d DCA
1979).
139. The court in DeSoto held that the employee has "the right to elect between the
appeal procedure available to him under Section 231.36(6) and the binding arbitration pro-
cedure provided in the collective bargaining agreement. Id. at 1015. If the employee elects
contract grievance procedures, he runs a risk that the arbitrator's award might not be en-
forced by a Florida court if a statute gives his public employer final authority to decide on
discipline. See Lake County Educ. Ass'n v. School Board, 380 So. 2d 1280 (Fla. 2d DCA
1978). For an analysis of judicial enforcement of public sector labor arbitration awards in
Florida, see Reed, Grievance Arbitration Awards in the Public Sector: How Final in Flor-
ida?, 35 U. MIAMI L. REV. 277 (1981).
140. For the process of appointing the State Career Service Commission by the Gover-
nor, see FLA. STAT. § 110.301(b) (1983).
141. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 231.35(b) (1983) (governing teachers).
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patronage, protection of government employees from arbitrary de-
cisions by government supervisors, and the need to satisfy the re-
quirements of due process established by decisions of the United
States Supreme Court. The job interests they protect normally are
not as broad as those protected by contract grievance procedures.
They primarily protect critical job interests that courts have iden-
tified as employee "property interests."" 2 Where these procedures
are available they provide the employee with a choice between the
statutory hearing or grievance procedures ending in arbitration.
e. A preferred balance?
This summary of the interests involved in individual versus
exclusive union control of the grievance process illustrates the
complexity of the issue, but does not reveal any obviously prefera-
ble policy. Many of the concerns of public employers and of the
collective could be satisfied by interpreting PERA section 447.401
as allowing an individual employee to grieve so long as a represen-
tative of the certified union is present at and free to participate in
any meeting or arbitration held to adjust the grievance, and the
grieving employee is precluded from being represented by a rival
union. The cost to the individual of grieving would ameliorate the
danger of individuals forcing arbitration over meritless grievances
so long as prohibiting the rival union's participation would discour-
age a rival union from financing grievances.
Allowing individuals to grieve may have an unintended conse-
quence that is more difficult to assess. The union might withdraw
from a grievance where it can say to the employee, "We think the
arbitrator will rule against you, but proceed on your own and we
will reimburse you if you win." This option would reduce the
union's current incentives to represent individual employees.14 3 It
also focuses too closely on arbitration as the central element of
grievance procedures. Adjustment of many grievances occurs dur-
ing the early steps of the grievance process. Pressuring the union
to find common ground for a settlement and the employee to ac-
cept the outcome may be a critical impetus to the early settlement
of most grievances.
This discussion of the policies supporting exclusive union con-
142. The State Career Service Commission has jurisdiction over complaints concerning
discharges, suspensions, pay reductions, layoffs, and demotions. FLA. STAT. § 110.305(3)
(1983).
143. Levy, supra note 7, at 1039.
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trol over grievances suggests that PERC overstated the potential
harm of allowing individuals to grieve on their own. Intermediate
solutions, however, such as allowing employees to grieve while re-
straining the involvement of rival unions, may be impractical. On
the other hand, the justification for exclusive union control must
be substantial to overcome the interest of the individual in a hear-
ing by an impartial arbitrator if the employee is willing to pay his
share of the costs.
Another approach is to maintain exclusive union control, but
to make the concept of fair representation more sensitive to the
situations of individual employees, particularly where the interests
of the individual employees conflict with those of the union. The
remainder of this article focuses on the issue of the appropriate
approach to the duty of fair representation in view of exclusive
union control over grievances.
III. FAIR REPRESENTATION AND DUE PROCESS
Both the doctrine of fair representation and the constitutional
guarantee of due process protect the job security expectancies of
Florida public sector employees working under collective bargain-
ing agreements. State action is present in the combination of
PERA section 447.307(3)(b), which makes certified unions exclu-
sive bargaining agents, 4 4 and PERA section 447.401, which man-
dates that all collective agreements give bargaining unit employees
equal access to a fair grievance procedure ending in final and bind-
ing arbitration. 4 5 State action is also present in the clauses of col-
lective agreements that guarantee employee job security and em-
ployment benefits and that give unions exclusive control over the
submission to arbitration of grievances growing out of these guar-
antees. 14 The state has created a regulatory scheme that provides
for exclusive union control over procedures for protecting em-
144. Section 447.307(3)(b) of the Florida Statutes provides for the certification of an
employee organization selected by a majority of the voting employees as the "exclusive col-
lective bargaining representative of all employees in the unit."
145. FLA. STAT. § 447.401 (1983). For the text of section 447.401, see supra note 9.
146. See Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 252-53 (1977) (Powell, J., concur-
ring). The Supreme Court held in Abood that exaction of union dues under a collective
agreement did not violate the first amendment so long as the union did not expend funds
derived from dues on political or ideological causes unrelated to the union's statutory role in
bargaining and administering collective agreements. There is, however, nothing in the ma-
jority opinion that suggests the majority disagreed with the characterization of a public sec-
tor collective agreement as state action, as set forth in Justice Powell's concurrence. See also
Winston v. United States Postal Serv., 585 F.2d 198 (7th Cir. 1978).
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ployee expectancies growing out of the terms of employment set
forth in collective agreements. The union's actions as the represen-
tative of individual employee interests therefore are subject to the
requirements of due process.147 Fair representation must satisfy
the constitutional standard of adequate representation."48
This does not mean that courts should evaluate all internal
union decisionmaking procedures in terms of due process. Federal
courts have avoided the problem of mixing constitutional law with
labor law under the NLRA by finding a statutory obligation of the
union to represent all employees fairly. 49 It has been understood
implicitly that fair representation satisfies due process. 1 0 There
was never any need to face the issue of state action in a union's
processing of grievances or to identify an employee's property or
liberty interest within the meaning of the fourteenth amendment.
Courts were free to look to the statutory policies underlying the
collective bargaining system to create a flexible doctrine balancing
the interests of the collective and of the individual employee.15
The same approach should be taken in the public sector.
PERC and the courts should look to public sector labor policy and
to PERA as the sources of fair representation doctrine. Because
employee grievances normally can be expressed in terms of the
state's acting to deprive an employee of an expectancy under the
collective agreement, constitutional law will always be in the back-
ground as an alternative body of law governing individual em-
ployee rights. If fair representation doctrine is as sensitive to the
constitutional values underlying due process as it is to the needs of
the collective bargaining system, courts will not be tempted to turn
to due process to regulate internal union decisionmaking.
There are different ways to characterize constitutional doc-
trine in examining the relationships between certified bargaining
agents and employees under PERA. The most common approach is
to view constitutional rights from the perspective of the individual
employee. This view is concerned with the individual's access to a
fair procedure for determining whether the state wrongfully de-
147. See Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32 (1940); Bi-Metallic Inv. Co. v. State Bd. of
Equalization, 239 U.S. 441 (1915); Bernheimer v. Converse, 206 U.S. 516 (1907).
148. See Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32 (1940).
149. Syres v. Oil Workers Int'l Union Local 23, 350 U.S. 892 (1955); Steele v. Louisville
& N.R.R., 323 U.S. 192 (1944). For a discussion of the state action issue under federal labor
statutes, see supra note 19.
150. See Winston v. United States Postal Serv., 585 F.2d 198 (7th Cir. 1978).
151. See Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171 (1967); Humphrey v. Moore, 375 U.S. 335 (1964);
Steele v. Louisville & N.R.R., 323 U.S. 192 (1944).
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prived the individual of an expectancy based on a statute or collec-
tive agreement.5 2 Because a union may decide that a grievance
lacks sufficient merit to justify arbitration, the aggrieved employee
may never have a hearing before an impartial adjudicator on the
merits of his claim.1" The union's procedures for investigating and
deciding a grievance must minimize the likelihood of a wrongful
deprivation of the employee's claim. Obviously there may arise
questions as to the impartiality of a union's judgment in this situa-
tion if the grieving employee is not a union member."
Another way of characterizing a union's role in terms of con-
stitutional law is to view PERA as setting up a representational
structure for the protection of employee rights. " Due process does
not require individualized hearings in all circumstances. 51 If the
state has sound policy reasons for establishing a representational
scheme for the protection of individual rights, there is no due pro-
cess problem so long as the representation is adequate. Conflicts of
152. To determine whether specific procedures are consistent with due process, the
courts weigh the importance of the individual's private interest, the length and finality of
the deprivation, the likelihood of government error, and the magnitude of the governmental
interest in the procedures. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334-35 (1976); Logan v. Zim-
merman, 455 U.S. 422 (1982). For an interesting critique of this balancing approach to due
process, see Mashaw, The Supreme Court's Due Process Calculus for Administrative Adju-
dication in Mathews v. Eldridge: Three Factors in Search of a Theory of Value, 44 U. Cm.
L. REv. 28 (1976).
153. See Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134 (1974); Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593
(1972); Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972).
154. See Schweiker v. McClure, 456 U.S. 188 (1982); Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 U.S. 564
(1973); Ward v. Village of Monroeville, 409 U.S. 57 (1972); Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510
(1927). These cases deal primarily with the problem of a biased adjudicator in the context of
a statutory procedure based on an adjudication model established for the purpose of pro-
tecting individual rights. The state may also establish an administrative model in which the
decisions about individual rights are part of the ongoing process of managing a public insti-
tution. In such circumstances a flexible balancing approach, which takes account of the indi-
vidual's stake and the state's interest in following procedures that reflect institutional con-
cerns, is appropriate. See Hortonville Joint School District No. 1 v. Hortonville Educ.
Ass'n, 426 U.S. 482, 494-96 (1976); Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972). It is arguable
that the role of a union in deciding whether to take a grievance to arbitration is more analo-
gous to that of the school board in Hortonville than to that of the judge in Tumey because
of the state's interest in a union's role as manager of a system of collective bargaining. On
the other hand, the most appropriate analogy is to the problem of structural bias inherent
in the scheme the state established for regulating the optometry profession in Gibson.
Structural bias is a central issue when a union is deciding the merits of a nonmember's
grievance. See infra text accompanying notes 239-80.
155. See cases cited supra note 147.
156. Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 43 (1940); Bernheimer v. Converse, 206 U.S. 516,
532 (1907). For an excellent discussion of state regulatory systems and the private right to a
hearing on regulatory decisions, see Stewart & Sunstein, Public Programs' and Private
Rights, 95 HARv. L. REv. 1193, 1255-316 (1982).
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interests between the representative and a subgroup or individual
within the class of employees are the analogue to the problem of
the biased adjudicator under the first approach."1
7
The latter approach is more consistent with the exclusive rep-
resentation model of collective bargaining, but the roots of both
due process concepts come from similar constitutional values. Both
focus on basic fairness of the procedures that the state establishes
to protect individuals from wrongful deprivation of their rights. A
decision about the validity of an employee's claim should be made
on the merits by an impartial adjudicator or by a representative
who has access to the best available information. Similarly situated
employees should be treated the same. Differences in the represen-
tative's treatment of individual members of the class should be ra-
tionally related to the state's reasons for establishing a representa-
tional system for the protection of individual rights.'"
Fair representation doctrine reflects these values. Unions may
neither discriminate nor act arbitrarily or in bad faith.1 59 A union's
failure to treat bargaining unit members evenhandedly is evidence
of bad faith or arbitrariness. 11 Failure to exercise due diligence in
the investigation and handling of an employee's grievance may
show that the union's decision not to submit the grievance to arbi-
tration was arbitrary. 10' The most difficult issues arise when a
union exercises due diligence, but tension between the union and
the employee raises questions as to the unbiased judgment of the
union or the adequacy of its representation. "
Interest conflicts between unions and minority employee
groups have always been one of the most difficult issues in labor
law doctrine.' As noted in the section on statutory policy, unions
157. See Hansberry, 311 U.S. at 44-45.
158. See Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422, 438-42 (1982) (Blackmun, J.,
separate opinion).
159. Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171 (1967).
160. See Smith v. Hussmann Refrigerator Co., 619 F.2d 1229 (8th Cir.), cert. denied,
449 U.S. 839 (1980); Gregg v. Teamsters Local 150, 699 F.2d 1015 (9th Cir. 1983).
161. See Foust v. International Bd. of Elec. Workers, 572 F.2d 710 (10th Cir. 1978);
Ruzicka v. General Motors Corp., 523 F.2d 306 (6th Cir. 1975).
162. See Holodmak v. Avco Corp., 381 F. Supp. 191 (D. Conn. 1974), aff'd in part and
rev'd in part, 514 F.2d 285 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 892 (1975); Clerk v. Hein-Werner
Corp., 8 Wis. 2d 264, 99 N.W.2d 132 (1959), reh'g denied, 8 Wis. 2d 277, 100 N.W.2d 317,
cert. denied, 362 U.S. 962 (1960).
163. See, e.g., Barton Brands, Ltd. v. NLRB, 529 F.2d 793 (7th Cir. 1976); Humphrey v.
Moore, 375 U.S. 335 (1964); Union News Co. v. Hildreth, 295 F.2d 658 (6th Cir. 1961), affd
on reh'g, 315 F.2d 548 (6th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 826 (1964). For a helpful treat-
ment of the tensions between the need for union discretion in making decisions and the
interests of minority groups of employees, see Finkin, supra note 7; Summers, supra note 7.
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need to have discretion to make judgments about competing inter-
ests among the employees in a bargaining unit.16 4 Such discretion
is critical to collective bargaining, which is based on the assump-
tion that the position of employees is strongest if they speak with a
united voice. Outer boundary constraints are necessary to protect
minority employees against abuses of power by the majority, but
these constraints should not undermine the basic principle of ma-
jority rule within the union.
In this context, individual grievances always pose a problem,
because the union must decide whether or not to use collective re-
sources to assist an individual employee. The decision involves
consideration of the likelihood of success on the merits and of the
implications of the grievance for other employees. The union must
weigh these factors against the cost of grieving and other uses to
which its resources might be put. "
The tension, inherent in all grievances, becomes greater when
the grievant is a non-union member. The union naturally will
weigh the fact that the grievant is a free-rider who does not con-
tribute to collective resources. The union also has an incentive to
use employee concern over the union's handling of nonmember
grievances to encourage employees to join the union.
To avoid constitutional problems, fair representation doctrine
should become more sensitive to the tension between unions and
individual grievants. The doctrine should distinguish among vari-
ous conflicts between unions and grievants based on the likelihood
that the tension will lead to a wrongful deprivation of an em-
ployee's expectancy. If there is reason to believe the union's deci-
sion not to grieve is based on a hidden motive unrelated to the
merits of the grievance, then the union should have the burden of
providing a justification for its decision. 6
Procedural solutions of the type proposed here, which use
shifting persuasion and production burdens to deal with situations
of mixed or hidden motives, are common in federal statutory em-
ployment law.167 They also have analogues in due process doc-
164. See supra text accompanying note 117.
165. See infra text accompanying notes 230-38.
166. For a discussion of the prima facie showing a grievant would have to make to
precipitate a shift in the production burden, see infra text accompanying notes 261-65.
167. The two principal areas where the court has faced problems of hidden or mixed
motive in employment law are Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352,
78 Stat. 241, 253 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 20003 (1976 & Supp. V 1981)) and
section 8(a)(3) of the NLRA, 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1976). Both concern employer motives
in decisions to hire,. discharge, or discipline employees. In the Title VII area, see Texas
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trine."" The remainder of this article treats the types of conflicts
that should place on the union a burden of producing a justifica-
tion for its actions. First, it may be helpful to deal briefly with the
argument that PERA section 447.401 is unconstitutional on its face
because it creates two classes of employees, members and non-
members, who do not have equal access to a fair procedure to re-
solve their contract grievances.
A. Nonmember Grievances: A Constitutional Challenge
PERA creates two classes of employees with different statu-
tory rights to grievance procedures. PERA guarantees "equal" ac-
cess to fair grievance proceedings by members and nonmembers,
but the union may refuse to represent nonmembers. 1' 9 The non-
member denied representation must use contract procedures estab-
lished by the union and the employer if he wishes to grieve a con-
tractual right individually. 7 ' These procedures are designed
primarily for situations in which the union is handling a grievance,
and not to ensure fairness to an employee proceeding individually.
The employee may participate with the employer in the selection
of an arbitrator. The union has no control over the choice of arbi-
trator, but in many cases has the right to be present at all griev-
ance proceedings to protect the interests of bargaining unit em-
ployees in issues of contract interpretation.'
Grieving nonmembers normally face a series of practical diffi-
culties. Arbitrators may worry that the employee will not pay his
share of the arbitration fee, particularly if the ruling goes against
the employee. Unions and employees regularly use arbitrators.
They have an incentive to pay promptly or else they risk future
problems in finding qualified arbitrators. Individual employees are
in a totally different situation. Arbitrators may make it their prac-
tice to ask individual employees to pay part of the fee in advance.
An arbitrator also has an incentive to please the employer and
Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981); Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Wa-
ters, 438 U.S. 567 (1978); McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). For the
problem of burden-shifting in section 8(a)(3) discrimination cases under the NLRA, see
NLRB v. Transportation Management Corp., 103 S. Ct. 2469 (1983).
168. See Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418 (1979); Mt. Healthy City School Dist. Bd. of
Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274 (1977).
169. FLA. STAT. § 447.401 (1983).
170. See In re School Bd. of Leon County, [1981] 7 F.P.E.R. 1 12,286 (June 26, 1981);
Heath v. School Bd., [1979] 5 F.P.E.R. 1 10,074 (Mar. 20, 1979).
171. See supra text accompanying notes 57-69.
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the union by his award.17 1 These two parties will select arbitrators
in the future, and the individual employee probably will not be in
a position to do so again. An arbitrator depends for his living on
being selected frequently. A ruling for the employee may make a
negative impression on both the employer and the union, but a
ruling against the employee clearly would please the employer and
normally would not antagonize the union. It would also suggest
that union members fare better in arbitration than do nonmem-
bers. These structural characteristics of arbitration make an arbi-
trator's ruling against a nonmember always somewhat suspect. The
appearance of bias raises the question whether an arbitration hear-
ing in these circumstances is "fair" within the meaning of the stat-
ute and due process.1
78
These procedures may be challenged on two constitutional
grounds: equal protection or due process. 174 The equal protection
argument is illustrated by the case of Logan v. Zimmerman Brush
Co.17 5 The plaintiff in Logan filed a charge against his employer for
unlawful discrimination with the Illinois Fair Employment Prac-
tices Commission. A statute gave the Commission 120 days within
which to convene a factfinding conference to obtain evidence, de-
termine the parties' positions, and explore settlement possibilities.
Through inadvertence the Commission failed to schedule the con-
ference within the 120-day period.1 76 The defendant employer
moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground that the Commis-
sion had failed to comply with the statutory mandate. The Com-
mission denied defendant's motion, but on petition for a writ of
prohibition, the Illinois Supreme Court held that the plaintiff was
subject to reasonable conditions that the Illinois legislature had
placed on causes of action for discrimination.1 77 One such condi-
172. See Schatzki, supra note 65, at 908 n.28; Summers, supra note 1, at 402.
173. See Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 U.S. 564 (1973); Ward v. Village of Monroeville, 409
U.S. 57 (1972); Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510 (1927).
174. See cases cited supra note 173 (cases concerned with biased adjudicators).
175. 455 U.S. 422, 438-42 (1982) (Blackmun, J., separate opinion). Although the Court
did not address the equal protection claim in Logan because the due process issue was de-
cided in the claimant's favor, Justice Blackmun noted that "the equal protection issue [is]
... sufficiently important to require comment on my part, particularly inasmuch as a ma-
jority of the Members of the Court are favorably inclined toward the claim, although, to be
sure, that majority is not the one that constitutes the Court for the controlling opinion." Id.
at 438 (footnote omitted).
176. Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. at 426.
177. Zimmerman Brush Co. v. Fair Employment Practice Comm'n., 82 11. 2d 99, 44 Il.




tion was that the Commission hold a hearing within 120 days or be
deprived of its jurisdiction. The complainant's right to redress
through the Commission had terminated.
The United States Supreme Court reversed, with Justice
Blackmun writing two opinions and Justice Powell writing a third.
The majority opinion focused on the violation of the plaintiff's due
process rights by the state's own inaction in denying a hearing on
the merits of Logan's claim.17 8 The majority opinion is relevant to
the issue of a union's power to deny an employee access to arbitra-
tion, which is discussed in the next section. The two other opinions
provide a basis for a facial challenge to the distinction between
member and nonmember employees for the purposes of grievance
processing.
A majority of the Court shared the view that the state's
scheme in Logan set up two classes of employees: those with claims
processed within 120 days and those with claims not processed
within that period.17 The first received a hearing on the merits.
The second group did not. While this time limit might encourage
the Commission to expedite the processing of claims, it. also de-
fined an "arbitrary line between otherwise identical claims." 80 In
addition, the legislative goal of encouraging timely action by the
Commission had only an attenuated connection to the distinction
between the two classes of claims. The classification scheme vio-
lated equal protection.1 81
Similarly, the distinction between members and nonmembers
in PERA section 447.401 is unrelated to the merits of employees'
grievances. An employee's membership or nonmembership in a
union has the potential to cause identical claims to be treated very
differently in terms of the fairness of the hearing they receive. To
validate this classification of claims, there must be a rational rela-
tionship between a legitimate governmental objective and the gov-
ernment's distinction between members' and nonmembers' claims.
The governmental objective may not be to encourage union
membership; such an objective is inconsistent with both the pre-
178. Logan, 455 U.S. at 433-38.
179. Three Justices joined in Justice Blackmun's separate opinion, finding that the
classification of claims into those that were processed within 120 days and those that were
not had no rational basis. Id. at 438-42 (Blackmun, J., separate opinion). Justices Powell
and Rehnquist also concurred, on the ground that the classification of claims had no ra-
tional relationship to the goal of timely disposition of claims. Id. at 443-44 (Powell, J.,
concurring).
180. Id. at 442 (Blackmun, J., separate opinion).
181. Id.
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amble to PERA182 and the right-to-work provision of the Florida
Constitution. 18 The two defensible objectives are protecting certi-
fied unions from the financial burden of grieving for substantial
numbers of nonmember employees and protecting member em-




unions do not have this protection, it may become uneconomical
for them to represent employees in large bargaining units with a
low percentage of membership. From the perspective of individual
union members, it is also unfair to make them pay for the individ-
ual grievances of nonmembers.
The justifications for classifying employees into members and
nonmembers withstand constitutional scrutiny under a rational ba-
sis test, but due process requires fair and unbiased procedures for
each group. The characteristics of arbitration that create an inher-
ent bias against the nonmember raise a serious constitutional issue.
The usual test for structural bias is whether the procedures "offer
a possible temptation to the average man as a judge to forget the
burden of proof. . . or which might lead him not to hold the bal-
ance nice, clear and true between [the parties] . . . ." " The test
presumes that the adjudicator himself is unbiased. 86 The burden
is on the party challenging the procedure to show that the struc-
ture of the dispute resolution process is inherently biased or that
the adjudicator has a personal pecuniary interest in the
outcome.187
Nonmember grievances present a difficult problem under this
test. Arbitrators are ethically bound to be impartial."' They must
disclose to the parties any personal interest or relationship that
might create an appearance of bias. Nevertheless, arbitrators al-
ways have a pecuniary interest in the outcome of grievances to the
extent that an award may make one party or the other decide not
182. The preamble states, "[Niothing herein shall be construed either to encourage or
discourage organization of public employees." FLA. STAT. § 447.201 (1983).
183. FLA. CONST. art. I, § 6.
184. Mack & Singer, supra note 123.
185. Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 532 (1927).
186. Schweiker v. McClure, 466 U.S. 188, 195 (1982); see also Withrow v. Larkin, 421
U.S. 35, 47 (1975); United States v. Morgan, 313 U.S. 409, 421 (1941).
187. Schweiker, 456 U.S. at 195-96; see also Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 U.S. 564, 578-79
(1973).
188. See CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR ARBITRATION OF LABOR MANAGE-
MENT DISPUTES § 2(B)(3) (requiring arbitrators to disclose to the parties any circumstance
"which might reasonably raise a question as to the arbitrator's impartiality"); see also Com-
monwealth Coatings Corp. v. Continental Casualty Co., 393 U.S. 145, 149 (1968) (require-
ment that arbitrators disclose any bias).
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to select the arbitrator again. The relationship between present
outcome and subsequent selection is skewed, however, in the non-
member situation. Of the two parties, only the employer will select
an arbitrator in the future, and the employer has a pecuniary in-
terest in the outcome of the arbitration.
On the other hand, the state has a strong interest in using ar-
bitration to resolve disputes under collective agreements.' se The
limited structural bias in favor of the employer may not constitute
bias under due process, however, given the presumption of the ar-
bitrator's personal impartiality and the possibility of judicial re-
view of the arbitrator's award.1 90
The question is a close one, but it easily could be rendered
moot if PERC decides to use its rulemaking power to ensure a fair
grievance procedure for nonmembers who are refused representa-
tion by their certified bargaining agents.' 9e Since bargaining agents
inevitably are in tension with nonmembers, it makes little sense to
allow the union and the employer to define the procedure that a
nonmember must follow to grieve. Once the union denies represen-
tation to the nonmember, the union waives its interest in control-
ling the procedures."92 At that point, the situation of nonmembers
in all bargaining units is essentially the same. PERC should as-
sume its statutory responsibility and use its rulemaking power to
assure nonmembers a "fair" arbitration hearing by establishing
uniform procedures to be followed by grieving nonmembers.
Giving the individual the choice between selecting an arbitra-
tor with the employer or having PERC appoint an arbitrator could
largely eliminate the inherent bias against the nonmember. The
option would create an incentive for arbitrators to demonstrate to
PERC their fairness in cases involving nonmembers as well as an
opportunity for PERC to evaluate arbitrators based on their prior
rulings. Individual grievants should have access to this informa-
tion. PERC might also establish guidelines to assist arbitrators
with issues concerning certified bargaining agents' participation in
189. See FLA. STAT. § 447.401 (1983).
190. See Schweiker v. McClure, 456 U.S. 188 (1982). The Court found no bias even
though the insurance carrier selected the hearing officers charged with determining the va-
lidity of the insurance carrier's denial of a claim. There was no further provision for review.
The case can be distinguished, however, because the Court found no bias on the part of the
carrier selecting the hearing officer and because payments on the claims came from federal
funds and not from the carrier's own funds. Id. at 195-97. Here, the employer must provide
a remedy out of the employer's resources if the arbitrator rules for the grievant.
191. See FLA. STAT. § 447.207(1) (1983).
192. See Florida PBA v. State, [1982] 8 F.P.E.R. 1 13,059 (Jan. 13, 1982).
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arbitration hearings of nonmember grievances. Finally, PERC
should establish a standarized means of ensuring that the individ-
ual grievant pays his share of the arbitrator's fee.1 93 Such interven-
tion by PERC would eliminate any appearance of bias in the sys-
tem of selecting arbitrators and would increase the legitimacy of
arbitrators' awards.
An alternative is to argue that there is no constitutional defi-
ciency in section 447.401 because an employee who elects to grieve
under a collective agreement waives any due process objection to
the contract procedures.19 4 Public employees who are included in a
bargaining unit normally enjoy limited job security guarantees
through civil service or other statutes and regulations. Such stat-
utes provide for some form of individual hearing if the employee is
discharged or has his employment status altered significantly.195
Due process is satisfied if the employee seeks redress through the
statutory hearing. The employee's decision to pursue a grievance
through contract grievance procedures might be viewed as a waiver
of any due process objection to those procedures.
B. Election of Remedies: A Waiver of Due Process?
Two major cases deal with the waiver of due process rights by
an agreement to follow contract grievance procedures.'" Those
cases consider primarily whether a union, as the representative of
bargaining unit employees, waives employees' due process rights
when it agrees to contract grievance procedures. Because these
cases deal with the question of a collective rather than individual
waiver, they are distinguishable from the situation of an individual
employee who chooses to follow contract grievance procedures in-
stead of statutory remedies. Nevertheless, they provide a useful
starting point to consider the waiver question, since an individual's
election to pursue contract grievance procedures is even more
knowing and voluntary than is a collective waiver through union
action.
193. The posting of a bond is an obvious option.
194. See Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 94 (1972); D.H. Overmyer Co. v. Frick Co., 405
U.S. 174, 185 (1972).
195. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 110.305(3) (1983) (governing state civil service employees);
id. § 231.36(6) (1983) (governing teachers).
196. Antinore v. State, 40 N.Y.2d 921, 358 N.E.2d 268, 389 N.Y.S.2d 576 (1976); Di
Lorenzo v. Carey, 62 A.D.2d 583, 405 N.Y.S.2d 356, appeal dismissed, 45 N.Y.2d 832, 381




Both cases arose in New York. Legislation provided that col-
lective agreements that contained grievance procedures for deter-
mining whether an employee had been wrongfully discharged
would supplant statutory procedures for reviewing dismissal deci-
sions.1 97 A certified bargaining agent negotiated an agreement
making all disciplinary actions subject to arbitration rather than
the statutory system, which provided for a trial-like hearing. A
permanent employee working under the collective agreement re-
ceived notice of charges and a prospective termination of employ-
ment. He declined arbitration on the grounds that arbitrators had
no duty to provide reasons for their rulings, to follow rules of evi-
dence, or to provide the employee with a transcript of the proceed-
ings unless the employee paid. The employee claimed the contract
arbitration procedures violated minimum due process standards.
Although the intermediate appellate court expressed doubt
whether the arbitration procedures met due process standards, it
held that the collective agreement waived the employee's right to
due process.19 8 The New York Court of Appeals affirmed.199
Generally, the waiver of an individual right must be knowing
and voluntary. 00 An individual's constitutional right not to be de-
prived of property without due process of law should not be
deemed waived because a majority of the individual's fellow work-
ers prefer contract grievance procedures to statutory hearing pro-
cedures. Constitutional rights should not be subject to majority
control.
20'
The creation of the expectancy that is the basis of the individ-
ual's property right is subject to majority control. The union has
discretion to decide in conjunction with the state the content of
the collective agreement 02 The union and the public employer
197. Act of May 15, 1972, ch. 283, § 1, 1972 N.Y. Laws 1432 (codified at N.Y. CIV. SERv.
LAw § 76(4) (McKinney 1973)).
198. Antinore v. State, 49 A.D.2d 6, 10, 371 N.Y.S.2d 213, 216 (1975).
199. Antinore v. State, 40 N.Y.2d 921, 358 N.E.2d 268, 389 N.Y.S.2d 576 (1976).
200. See Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 94-95 (1972); D.H. Overmyer Co. v. Frick Co.,
405 U.S. 174, 185-86 (1972).
201. See Lucas v. Colorado Gen. Assembly, 377 U.S. 713, 736-37 (1964); see also Finkin,
supra note 7, at 249-53; cf. Kewin v. Board of Educ., 65 Mich. App. 472, 237 N.W.2d 514
(1975) (court held impermissible a waiver in a collective agreement of the constitutional
right to individual maternity leave as set forth in Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414
U.S. 632 (1974)).
202. See Humphrey v. Moore, 375 U.S. 335 (1964); Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman, 346
U.S. 330 (1953); Steele v. Louisville & N.R.R., 323 U.S. 192 (1942). The logic of these pri-
vate sector cases has been adopted as the basis for the standard of fair representation under
PERA. See Ritcey v. School Bd., [19821 8 F.P.E.R. V 13,282 (June 30, 1982).
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also have political discretion to decide how employee expectancies
will be protected through contract dispute resolution procedures.0 3
This means that a majority of employees, acting through the
union, may substitute arbitration for statutory hearing proce-
dures.20 4 However, the substituted arbitration procedures should
still satisfy minimum due process standards.
Statutory guarantees and collective agreements are simply dif-
ferent legal means used by the state to define and protect the job
security of public employees. Both create individual expectancies.
The former rely on an individually oriented remedial system; the
latter establish a representational structure for the protection of
the expectancy. To determine whether or not the procedures of
each system meet due process, it is necessary to examine the na-
ture of the individual's interest in the benefit, the possibility of an
erroneous deprivation of that interest, the relative effectiveness of
other safeguards, and the government's interest in the existing re-
medial system.208 The needs of the government in creating a func-
tioning system of collective bargaining are different than the
problems present in providing guarantees to unorganized employ-
ees. The different context of collective bargaining requires a court
to take account of other policy considerations that justify a repre-
sentational scheme, but due process still applies.
When an individual elects to pursue contract grievance proce-
dures rather than a statutory appeal, he does so voluntarily, know-
ing that the contract requires him to grieve through the union. The
issue is not whether the individual has waived due process rights
by agreeing to contract grievance procedures; it is whether the
election of one of two procedures established by the state implies
that the individual waives the right to object on due process
grounds to the procedures of the forum he selects. 06
Such a waiver does not necessarily occur when an individual
has a choice between different forums or procedures. For example,
203. See Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171 (1967), adopted by PERC in Heath v. School Bd.,
[1979] 5 F.P.E.R. 1 10,074 (Mar. 20, 1979).
204. New York law makes negotiated union contract grievance procedures a replace-
ment for statutory procedures. Act of May 15, 1972, ch. 283, § 1, 1972 N.Y. Laws 1432
(codified at N.Y. Civ. SERV. LAW § 76(4) (McKinney 1973)). In Florida the individual em-
ployees preserve the option between contract grievance procedures and statutory proce-
dures. FLA. STAT. § 447.401 (1983).
205. See Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422 (1982); Mathews v. Eldridge,
424 U.S. 319 (1976).
206. For an excellent analysis of the concept of "waiver," see Rubin, Toward a General
Theory of Waiver, 28 UCLA L. REv. 478 (1981).
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if a plaintiff with a cause of action for employment discrimination
chooses either to litigate individually or to proceed as a member of
a class action, the individual plaintiff does not give up his due pro-
cess rights by opting to become a member of the class.20 7 He
merely agrees to have his substantive rights determined in a par-
ticular procedural setting. He does not, however, have the same
individual control that he could exercise in an individual action. In
a sense, he waives his right to the due process standard that would
apply in an individual action, but he has a due process right to
procedures that are consistent with the problems of managing
group litigation.
In the same' sense, an employee may pursue a fair representa-
tion claim as an unfair labor practice charge with the NLRB or as
a court action. In the former, the procedures defined by Congress
are very different from a court action, because of the state's inter-
est in having the General Counsel control the unfair labor practice
proceedings. The individual's decision to file a clarge with the
NLRB does not mean, however, that due process does not apply to
NLRB proceedings. Likewise, an employee who elects to grieve
under a collective agreement rather than seek a statutory hearing
must realize that the grievance procedures reflect the needs of a
system of collective bargaining, but the employee does not waive
his individual due process rights.
C. Exclusive Union Control and Due Process: Is the Union an
Adequate Representative?
Constitutional challenges to the doctrines of exclusive and fair
representation have been rare.2 08 The NLRB and the federal courts
generally have avoided finding state action in the certification of
exclusive bargaining agents. 0 9 If certification does not constitute
state action, then there is no state action in a collective agreement
between a union and a private employer. This changed, however,
when Congress made postal workers subject to the NLRB's juris-
207. See Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156 (1974); Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S.
32 (1940); Gonzales v. Cassidy, 474 F.2d 67 (5th Cir. 1973). For an application of the due
process standards underlying these decisions to adequacy of representation in a Title VII
action, see Wetzel v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 508 F.2d 239 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 421 U.S.
1011 (1975).
208. See Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209 (1977); Winston v. United States
Postal Serv., 585 F.2d 198 (7th Cir. 1978).
209. For a discussion of NLRB certification as state action, see supra note 19.
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diction210 In Winston v. United States Postal Service, two dis-
charged postal workers challenged, on due process grounds, the
union's refusal to arbitrate their grievances. The employees filed
suit in federal district court, claiming that their discharges oc-
curred without "an opportunity for a fair hearing, including the
right to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses and to pre-
sent evidence of their own to rebut the charges against them." '
The district court, relying on Arnett v. Kennedy,2  held that
the employees were entitled to no more due process than was af-
forded by the national collective agreement that was the source of
their property interest in their jobs.21' The circuit court affirmed
the judgment, but rejected the district court's reasoning. The court
of appeals held that the procedures to protect the property interest
were subject to constitutional scrutiny, but that the grievance pro-
cedures coupled with the union's duty of fair representation satis-
fied due process.2 1' The court pointed to the informal appeals to
successively higher levels of management, and to the union's right
to obtain information and documents in investigations of employee
grievances. The court held that these procedures provided ade-
quate safeguards against the risk of erroneous deprivation of an
employee's property interest in his job. The opinion emphasized
the vital governmental interests that unions advanced in facilitat-
ing the early elimination of frivolous claims. The court concluded
that the duty of fair representation action is a sufficient check on
arbitrary union decisions to protect individual employees'
interests.21
The difference between the district and circuit court opinions
reflects the problem of characterizing an employee's expectancy
under a collective agreement. The union's control over access to
grievance procedures can be seen as a condition on the employee's
expectancy under the contract defining the scope of the property
right 1a Alternatively, the employee's expectancy that he will not
be discharged or disciplined without just cause may be viewed as a
substantive right deserving the minimum protections of due pro-
cess, and the union's control may be analyzed as a part of the pro-
210. Postal Reorganization Act, Pub. L. No. 91-375, 84 Stat. 719, 728 (1970) (codified as
amended at 39 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1011, 1201-1209 (1976 & Supp. V 1981)).
211. Winston v. United States Postal Serv., 585 F.2d 198, 201 (7th Cir. 1978).
212. 416 U.S. 134 (1974).
213. Winston v. United States Postal Serv., 432 F. Supp. 1117, 1121 (N.D. I1. 1977).
214. 585 F.2d at 209-10.
215. Id.
216. See Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341 (1976); Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134 (1974).
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cedure for protecting the employee's interest.2"
There is support for the. latter characterization in the Supreme
Court's recent due process opinion in Logan v. Zimmerman Brush
Co.,218 but, however the employee's interest is characterized, the
central issue is the same. Collective agreements normally guarantee
that employees will not be discharged or disciplined without just
cause. The employee is entitled to a fair procedure for determining
whether or not he has erroneously been deprived of an employ-
ment expectancy. The government has an interest in union control
over grievances to facilitate the prompt settlement of employee
claims, to avoid expenditure of public resources in arbitration of
frivolous claims, and to ensure consistency in contract interpreta-
tion. The court in Winston found that fair representation doctrine
struck a constitutionally permissible balance among those
interests.
219
When a union decides not to arbitrate, it makes the threshold
decision on the merits of the grievance. If the union is reasonably
diligent in its investigation and decides in good faith that the
grievance should not be taken to arbitration, then the employee
has no right to relief in a subsequent fair representation action.22 0
If the union's decision was not arbitrary or made in bad faith, then
the court does not reach the question whether the employee was in
fact discharged or disciplined without just cause. The employee
never receives a formal hearing on the merits of the claim of
wrongful deprivation.22'
One commentator has argued that the union's internal deci-
sionmaking procedures should provide the equivalent of a formal
hearing.22  Another legal scholar has suggested limiting the concept
of a property interest arising out of a collective agreement to cases
involving discharges or serious threats to individual job security.223
The scholar concludes that, in such cases, any public employee de-
nied access to arbitration by a union should have a court hearing
on the merits of the grievance. The employer might defend on the
217. See Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422 (1982); Bishop v. Wood, 426
U.S. 341, 353-54 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
218. 455 U.S. at 428-33.
219. 585 F.2d at 209-10.
220. Vaca v. Sipes, .386 U.S. 171 (1967); Galbreath v. Broward County Classroom
Teachers' Ass'n, [1981] 7 F.P.E.R. 1 12,288 (June 26, 1981), aff'd, 424 So. 2d 837 (Fla. 4th
DCA 1982), afl'd, 9 FLA. L. WEEKLY 33 (Sup. Ct. Jan. 26, 1984).
221. See Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171 (1967).
222. See Note, supra note 17.
223. See Finkin, supra note 7, at 262-63.
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ground that an arbitration hearing would not have altered his deci-
sion to discharge or suspend the employee, but the union's refusal
to arbitrate would not be a defense. The employee would have a
right to damages from the employer, and, to the extent that the
union aggravated the deprivation by its decision not to arbitrate,
the employer could recover from the union for contribution. "
Such solutions obviously would satisfy due process, but they
have serious implications for the interests of the state and for the
collective concerns of organized employees. If unions had to hold
formal hearings in every grievance case, courts would have to use
due process doctrine in reviewing the day-to-day decisions of un-
ions administering collective agreements. The other solution, to
guarantee a court hearing on the merits of every grievance involv-
ing individual job security that a union chose not to arbitrate,
would provide an incentive for the union and the employer to arbi-
trate all discharge and discipline cases. Otherwise, they would face
the possibility of lengthy and costly litigation. The cost of litiga-
tion would be a deterrent to employees with weak grievances, but
because fair representation would not be a defense, early disposi-
tion of actions through summary judgment for the employer or
union would be rare. Cases might be brought simply for their set-
tlement value.
The proposed solutions assume that an employee is entitled to
an individual hearing. The central concern of due process doctrine
is providing access to fair procedures to protect the individual
from wrongful deprivation of his property rights.225 As the court
pointed out in Winston, the preliminary grievance steps under a
contract provide an opportunity for the union to investigate the
grievance fully, to present to the employer the employee's view of
what occurred, and to hear the employer's response. 26 As long as
there is no conflict of interests between the union and the em-
ployee that would raise questions about the union's evaluation of
the employee's grievance, the likelihood of a wrongful deprivation
is small. The state has a strong policy interest in maintaining a
representational system to protect employee rights. The union's
judgment should be respected unless there is some basis in the re-
cord for questioning the impartiality of the union.22
224. Id. at 262.
225. See Memphis Light, Gas & Water Div. v. Craft, 436 U.S. 1 (1978); Mathews v.
Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976); Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975).
226. 585 F.2d at 209-10.
227. See, e.g., Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32 (1940). The Court in Hansberry was con-
[Vol. 37:573
LABOR LAW
From a due process perspective, a biased adjudicator or an in-
adequate representative affects only the fairness of the process for
making a judgment. Due process does not provide a basis for chal-
lenging the merits of a procedurally fair decision. Fair representa-
tion doctrine also deals primarily with procedural fairness, but it
establishes some outer limits on a union's substantive decision
since it is based on a union's statutory obligation.2 28 Such con-
straints on the substance of a union's discretion to make choices
among conflicting interests within a bargaining unit can only come
from the statute and from labor policies underlying the system of
collective bargaining, not from due process. Fair representation
doctrine integrates substantive labor policy with concern for proce-
dural fairness. It provides a developed framework for balancing the
interests of the individual employee and the collective. The sensi-
ble approach, then, is to ask whether current fair representation
doctrine is sufficiently sensitive to the constitutional values under-
lying due process.
The bad faith standard of fair representation reflects the same
concern as due process does about the possible bias of adjudica-
tors. The problem lies in determining what types of conflicts be-
tween the union's and the individual's interests should lead a court
to question the impartiality of the union's decision not to arbitrate.
In difficult cases, the union's decision involves choices among com-
peting employee interests. Unions must be free to make those
choices without fear of litigation, or else they will be unable to ful-
cerned with the due process underpinnings of the adequacy of representation doctrine in
class actions, but the concerns are similar. A judgment does not bind class members if there
is an inherent conflict of interests between the class representative and the class member. If
the union is an inadequate representative for the interests of an individual employee be-
cause of a conflict of interests with the employee, the results of the grievance procedures
should not bind the individual. See Clark v. Hein-Werner Corp., 8 Wis. 2d 264, 99 N.W.2d
132 (1959), reh'g denied, 8 Wis. 2d 264, 100 N.W.2d 317 (1960), cert. denied sub nom. Local
1377, Int'l Ass'n of Machinists v. Hein-Werner Corp., 362 U.S. 962 (1960) (where two groups
of employees had opposing interests and union espoused cause of one group in arbitration,
other group had no fair representation); Holodnak v. Avco Corp., 381 F. Supp. 191 (D.
Conn. 1974), affd in part, rev'd in part, 514 F.2d 285 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 892
(1975) (union attorney representing employee in arbitration failing to vigorously argue that
dismissal violated first amendment rights of employee who had published an article critical
of both employer and union held not fair representation).
228. The obligation not to make decisions arbitrarily or in bad faith constitutes an
outer boundary constraint on the substance of the decision. Courts, however, often blur the
distinction between the issue whether or not a union's decision was "arbitrary" because it
was procedurally defective and the issue whether or not the union had any substantive justi-
fication to favor one group over another. See, e.g., Gregg v. Teamsters Local 150, 699 F.2d
1015 (9th Cir. 1983); Smith v. Hussmann Refrigerator Co., 619 F.2d 1229 (8th Cir.), cert.
denied, 449 U.S. 839 (1980).
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fill their role as exclusive bargaining agent. Inherent in all griev-
ances is a tension between the individual's interest in having his
grievance heard on the merits by an arbitrator and the union's re-
luctance to use collective funds to finance arbitration. Another
kind of tension exists when the grievant is not a union member
and does not contribute to the costs of bargaining and grieving.
Both situations are distinguishable from a third situation in which
the union disagrees with the merits of an employee's grievance be-
cause of its implications for other similarly situated employees or
for the employer. In the third situation, the union makes a judg-
ment that the position advocated by the individual employee may
force an employer to behave in a way adverse to the long-term in-
terests of the collective. Each situation merits separate considera-
tion to determine whether fair representation doctrine should be
altered to be more sensitive to constitutional values. 29
1. LIKELIHOOD OF SUCCESS ON THE MERITS VERSUS COSTS OF
GRIEVING
A union always confronts the question whether an employee's
grievance justifies the expenditure of common funds for arbitra-
tion. Because the grievance is costless to the individual employee,
except for potential problems with a supervisor who may resent
the grievant, the union is the only party in a position to weigh the
costs of grieving against the probability of a favorable ruling. In
Vaca v. Sipes, 80 the Supreme Court underscored the importance
of the union's role in screening frivolous grievances and settling
others short of arbitration. PERC has reiterated the same policies,
pointing out how the early elimination of frivolous grievances saves
money for the public employer and, in turn, the taxpayer.2"'
Even if a grievance has merit, courts have ruled that the union
has discretion to refuse to arbitrate if it feels that the likelihood of
success is outweighed by the costs of grieving. In Carth v. Faraday,
Inc.,'821 a private sector case, a local union determined that a griev-
ance was meritorious. The international union nevertheless advised
against grieving, because an arbitrator would probably rule against
229. For a more systematic treatment of different conflict situations between a union
and an employee, and their implications for the fair representation doctrine, see Summers,
supra note 7.
230. 386 U.S. 171, 191-92 (1967).
231. In re School Bd. of Leon County, [1981] 7 F.P.E.R. 1 12,286, at 580 (June 26,
1981).
232. 401 F. Supp. 678 (E.D. Mich. 1975).
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the employee, and the local was short of funds. The federal district
court ruled that, given the condition of its treasury, the local's final
decision not to grieve "was based on rational and objective
grounds, and therefore it cannot be deemed arbitrary." 33 The
court noted that the union had discretion to put the interests of
the whole ahead of the interests of a single member.1
3 4
If saving costs was the only issue in such cases, a balance could
be struck between group and individual interests. As Professor
Summers has suggested, the exclusive bargaining agent might
withdraw from a grievance, and the individual employee could pro-
ceed to arbitration using his own funds to obtain representation
and pay his share of the costs of arbitration." ' The employer could
protect himself by requiring the employee to post a bond to pay
the employer's cost of arbitrating should the employee lose. If the
employee wins the arbitration, the union would have to reimburse
the employee for his attorneys' fees and arbitration costs.
2 36
This solution would place a heavy financial burden on any in-
dividual employee who chose to proceed after the union denied his
grievance as nonmeritorious. It would, however, be quicker and less
costly than a court action based on the union's breach of its duty
of fair representation. The financial burden would deter individu-
als from proceeding unless they were convinced of the merit of
their grievances.
Objections to employees grieving individually were discussed
earlier, in the context of the interpretation of PERA section
447.301(4). " 7 The issue is one of statutory interpretation, but its
resolution has obvious implications for the doctrine of fair repre-
sentation. The most common objection to allowing an individual to
grieve is that it takes the grievance process out of the bargaining
agent's control. The union and the employer cannot anticipate
every situation that will arise under a contract. Contract language
is at times left ambiguous to allow the parties to work out their
problems through negotiation of specific grievances. All bargaining
unit members have an interest in this process. To allow an individ-
ual employee to upset a settlement that the employee regards as
unfair could undermine the ongoing process of refining the agree-
ment's meaning through grievance negotiation. It also could lead to
233. Id. at 681.
234. Id.
235. Summers, supra note 1, at 399-404.
236. Id. at 403.
237. See supra text accompanying notes 117-32.
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inconsistency in the outcomes of similar grievances, undermine the
union's status as exclusive representative, and foster internal divi-
sions within the union.
On the other hand, most grievances that are critical to the in-
terests of individual employees involve factual disputes over the
justification for discipline or discharge. The collective's interest in
the determination of such factual conflicts is usually minimal. To
the extent that general issues of contract interpretation are at
stake, the union should be allowed to participate in all adjustment
sessions and in the arbitration hearing to advocate the collective's
interests.2 88
Individual access to arbitration could make it easier for unions
to withdraw from questionable grievances, but it is difficult to pre-
dict whether or not this would occur. If the union's withdrawal
would not give the employee a fair representation action against
the union, then the incentive for the union to represent individual
employees would be even weaker. That result would be contrary to
the policy of improving the protection accorded individual em-
ployee expectancies by the representational system.
Most grievances are settled short of arbitration. Allowing indi-
viduals to grieve focuses on arbitration as the central element of
grievance proceedings. In fact, arbitration is the exception rather
than the rule. Union control over the decision whether or not to
use collective funds to arbitrate exerts pressure on the union to
identify common grounds for settlement. There is also pressure on
the employee to accept the 'settlement unless he believes he could
win a fair representation action against the union. Allowing the
union to shift this pressure to the individual employee would have
a negative effect on the initial negotiations between the employer
and the union. The employer would not know whether the union or
the employee would be making the final decision about settlement.
The other fundamental problem with allowing the individual
to grieve is that it provides an opportunity for a rival union to use
grievance procedures to undermine the position of the bargaining
representative. If the individual is free to take a grievance to arbi-
tration, a rival union may volunteer to assist the employee at no
cost and without regard to the likelihood of success, in order to
attract the attention of all employees. The rival could boast of its
willingness to press grievances, in contrast to the certified agent's
238. See Summers, supra note 1, at 400 (suggesting a form of three-cornered arbitra-
tion in such circumstances).
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refusal to grieve, and thereby undermine the status of the bargain-
ing agent or force the certified union to overgrieve in order to keep
out the rival. Overgrieving is the type of problem that the member-
ship should police through internal union procedures, but the col-
lective's interest differs from the union's interest and it may not be
easy for the members to control union officials.
The public employer has the same interest as the bargaining
agent in minimizing the threat of a rival union. If the certified
union is forced to become more aggressive in handling grievances it
will disrupt the working relationship between the certified union
and the employer. The bargaining agent's ability to adjust conflicts
among employees by internal union procedures and without in-
volving the employer may be weakened. The employer may be
caught in the middle between a rival union making demands on
behalf of a dissenting minority of employees and the certified bar-
gaining agent representing a majority of employees.
From the viewpoint of the collective, competition among un-
ions may increase the certified agent's sensitivity to the needs of
employees, but it also undermines the collective's solidarity. Since
public employees do' not have the right to strike, the importance of
solidarity is questionable. The possibility of an illegal strike, how-
ever, is always an unspoken threat in bargaining. In addition, cohe-
siveness is important to the collective's ability to win benefits
through lobbying and electing public officials who favor union
interests.
This assessment of the conflicting interests of unions, employ-
ers, and employees produces no clear solution. It suggests that
union control of grievance procedures is an important factor in the
early settlement of grievances, in the union's capacity to adjust
conflicts among employees internally, in the employer's costs of
grieving, and in stable labor relations generally. The tension be-
tween the union and the employee over the costs of grieving is not
likely to result in a biased decision. On the contrary, it creates
pressures that are critical to the smooth operation of the grievance
system. It allows a party who is more objective than the individual
employee to make a considered choice between the costs of arbitra-
tion and the likelihood of success.
2. DENYING A NONMEMBER'S GRIEVANCE ON THE MERITS
Where the employee whose grievance is denied is not a mem-
ber of the certified union, the fair representation question is more
complicated. The basic issue becomes whether the possibility of
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union bias against a nonmember so increases the probability of an
erroneous denial of a grievance as to justify requiring the exclusive
bargaining agent to give a written explanation of its decision. Com-
panion PERC decisions, Galbreath v. School Board3 9 and Gal-
breath v. Broward County Classroom Teachers' Association
(CTA), 4 0 illustrate the problem.
In October 1978, Galbreath, a public school teacher, filed a re-
quest with his school principal for overtime compensation in the
amount of $4,000.241 The principal replied by memorandum, ac-
knowledging that Galbreath had worked overtime hours, but re-
jecting the request on the ground that the school board's policy
covering overtime pay for teachers was unclear. He suggested Gal-
breath contact a higher authority to have the policy clarified.242
Galbreath wrote to the school superintendent, who instructed
the principal to pay Galbreath for authorized overtime.243 The
principal responded that the overtime Galbreath was claiming had
not been authorized in advance, but acknowledged that Galbreath
might have been negligent had he not taken the initiative to work
overtime to protect school property from damage. 44 The superin-
tendent replied that unauthorized overtime could not be
compensated.24
Galbreath then filed a grievance under the collective agree-
ment between the CTA and the school board, and he consulted an
independent attorney. The board denied his grievance, and he ad-
vanced to the next stage of the grievance process. 246 The board no-
tified him that he could represent himself or the bargaining agent
could represent him; he could not bring in outside counsel to ad-
vise him during a second-stage conference. 47 Galbreath objected to
the denial of counsel, but he allowed the CTA to represent him.2 4 8
239. [1981] 7 F.P.E.R. 1 12,287 (June 26, 1981), afl'd, 424 So. 2d 837 (Fla. 4th DCA
1982), afl'd, 9 FLA. L. WEEKLv 33 (Sup. Ct. Jan. 26, 1984).
240. Id. at 12,288, aff'd, 424 So. 2d 837 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982), afJ'd, 9 FLA. L. WEEKLY
33 (Sup. Ct. Jan. 26, 1984).
241. Answer Brief of Appellee Public Employees Relations Commission at 3 (citing re-





246. Galbreath v. School Bd., [1981] 7 F.P.E.R. at 582.
247. Id.
248. Galbreath v. Broward County Classroom Teachers' Ass'n, No. 81-6403, at 2 (S.D.




The board again denied his grievance.
Galbreath, who had resigned from the union and quit paying
his dues approximately a year before he initiated the grievance,
then asked the CTA to submit his grievance to arbitration in ac-
cordance with procedures under the collective agreement.24' The
union responded as follows:
Having reviewed your case referred to above, CTA has decided
not to pursue the matter to arbitration since in our judgment it
lacks merit. In an effort to preserve your rights, we have re-
quested and received an extension of the timeliness to file for
arbitration to October 31, 1980. A letter from Mr. Seigle will
confirm. I would recommend that you discuss this letter with
your attorney to determine if you and he would want to pursue
the matter on your own.250
Galbreath then asked the school board to arbitrate and advised the
board that his own counsel would represent him.2"  The school
board denied the arbitration request, stating that under the collec-
tive agreement, only the CTA could submit a case to arbitration. "'
Galbreath filed unfair labor practice charges against the CTA
for breach of the union's statutory duty of fair representation. He
also filed charges against the Broward School Board under PERA
section 447.501(f) for refusing to discuss his grievance in good faith
and for denying him access to grievance arbitration procedures."'
PERC summarily dismissed both cases. PERC dismissed the first
case on the ground that the allegation against the union was insuf-
ficient to establish a prima facie violation of the duty of fair repre-
sentation.2 " Galbreath had submitted no evidence to support the
contention that his grievance was denied because he was a non-
member. Citing Vaca v. Sipes, PERC held that, as a nonmem-
ber, he had the burden of demonstrating that the union acted in
an arbitrary or discriminatory manner or in bad faith. Conclusory
allegations were insufficient to support the charge.'
PERC dismissed the charge against the school board in reli-
249. Galbreath v. School Bd., [19811 7 F.P.E.R. at 582.
250. Id.
251. See supra note 248, at 2.
252. Id.
253. Galbreath v. Broward County Classroom Teachers' Ass'n, [19811 7 F.P.E.R.
12,288 (June 26, 1981); Galbreath v. School Bd., [1981] 7 F.P.E.R. 12,287 (June 26, 1981).
254. Galbreath v. Broward County Classroom Teachers' Ass'n, [19811 7 F.P.E.R. at 584.
255. Id. at 583.
256. Id.
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ance on In re School Board of Leon County. 257 In that case, PERC
held that a public employer had no obligation to arbitrate a griev-
ance where the collective agreement gave the certified agent exclu-
sive control over access to arbitration and the agent had denied the
employee's request to arbitrate because the grievance lacked
merit.
2 8
On appeal, the Florida Fourth District Court of Appeal af-
firmed both dismissals, but the court addressed only the issue of
statutory interpretation raised by the charge against the school
board.259 The district court of appeal, without discussing the fair
representation issues raised in the charge against the union, certi-
fied the issue of an individual employee's statutory right to grieve
to the Florida Supreme Court. The district court of appeal af-
firmed without opinion PERC's holding that an allegation that a
union had denied a grievance as unmeritorious because of the
grievant's nonmember status was insufficient to avoid summary
dismissal of the fair representation charge.6 0
In cases such as Galbreath, it often is difficult for the em-
ployee to provide additional factual support for an allegation of
union bias. The issue is essentially one of motive, and the deci-
sionmaker has mixed incentives. The union wants to demonstrate
that it will process every grievance competently and fairly. At the
same time, employees' membership dues are necessary to the eco-
nomic survival of a union, and employee concern over the dedica-
257. [1981] 7 F.P.E.R. 1 12,286 (June 26, 1981); Galbreath v. School Bd., [1981] 7
F.P.E.R. at 582.
258. In re School Bd. of Leon County, [1981] 7 F.P.E.R. at 579.
259. Galbreath v. School Bd. 424 So. 2d 837 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982).
260. The Florida Supreme Court affirmed, but the question certified to the Supreme
Court only related to the public employer's obligation to arbitrate a dispute when the union
declines to process a grievance on the ground that it lacks merit. Galbreath v. School Bd., 9
FLA. L. WzEKLY 33 (Sup. Ct. Jan. 26, 1984). The certified question was only concerned with
the charges filed against the School Board and not with the issue of whether PERC cor-
rectly dismissed the duty of fair representation charge against the union. By limiting its
opinion to the certified issue, the court left open the duty of fair representation issues that
are the central concern of this article.
Appellant did raise both equal protection and due process issues as a basis for challeng-
ing the distinction in section 447.401 between the union's duties to members and nonmem-
bers, but the court dismissed this argument in one sentence as being "without merit." Id. at
34. In a motion for rehearing, appellant noted that "[tihe Court did show substantial con-
cern during oral argument about the Union having the final say on the merits of Galbreath's
grievance and as to whether he would be allowed access to arbitration. However, no com-
ment was made on that issue in the final opinion." Petitioner's Motion for Rehearing and
Reconsideration at 4, Galbreath. Given the nature of the certified question and the fact that
neither PERC nor the district court directly confronts these issues in their opinions, it is not
surprising that the Supreme Court decided not to deal with the issues in its opinion.
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tion with which nonmember grievances are processed may en-
courage membership.
The United States Supreme Court has dealt with a similar
problem of determining hidden motive in Title VII cases through
the procedural mechanism of shifting the burden of production of
evidence to the defendant once the plaintiff has made out a prima
facie case of discrimination.2 " 1 To shift the burden to the defen-
dant, plaintiff must show that he is a member of a protected mi-
nority, that he applied for a position for which he was qualified,
and that the employer rejected his application and continued to
consider other applicants for the same position. The burden then
shifts to the employer to articulate legitimate and nondiscrimina-
tory reasons for rejecting the employee. If the employer meets this
production burden, the employee must then show that the reasons
advanced by the employer were simply a pretext for a discrimina-
tory discharge. The employee always has the burden of persuasion
on the ultimate issue of motive, and on such subsidiary issues as
whether the employer's reasons were a pretext. Only the burden of
producing evidence shifts from plaintiff to defendant. 26 2
The Supreme Court has taken a somewhat different approach
in NLRB cases involving the discharge of employees for engaging
in protected concerted activity.26 3 The General Counsel must
demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that the pro-
tected activity was a motivating factor in the discharge. Even so,
the employer may still avoid the unfair labor practice charge by
carrying the burden of persuasion on the affirmative defense that
the discharge rested on the employee's unprotected as well as pro-
tected conduct, and that the employee would have lost his job any-
way.2 6' This approach is used in mixed-motive cases, whereas the
Title VII approach of shifting only the production burden is in-
tended to determine whether the employer based his decision on
legal or illegal hidden motives. "65
The situation of a non-union member in a fair representation
case is closer to the Title VII than to the mixed-motive situation.
The plaintiff may make out a prima facie case by showing that he
filed a grievance, that the grievance raised factual issues or ques-
261. Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981); Furnco Constr.
Co. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567 (1978); McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
262. Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981).
263. See NLRB v. Transportation Management Corp., 103 S. Ct. 2469 (1983).
264. Id. at 2473-74.
265. Id. at 2473 n.5.
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tions of contract interpretation about whether the employer vio-
lated the terms of the collective agreement, and that the union re-
fused to process the grievance as unmeritorious under
circumstances that suggested an improper motive. The last re-
quirement would be met whenever the employee can point to con-
flict or tension between his individual interests and the institu-
tional interests of the union. Alleging nonmembership should
satisfy this burden, because the union's interest in using the
processing of grievances to encourage membership suggests an in-
herent conflict of interest. In the case of a member, the burden
might be met by showing that denial of the grievance enhanced the
union's position as exclusive representative because other employ-
ees within the unit benefited from the individual employee's griev-
ance being denied. Since the union lawfully may act in good faith
to benefit some employees at the expense of other employees' indi-
vidual interests, the latter situation raises an issue not of hidden
motive but of the arbitrariness of the union's decision."" In both
cases of hidden motive and of arbitrariness, the production burden
should shift to the union to demonstrate that it carefully investi-
gated the grievance and that it had substantial reasons for refusing
to take the grievance to arbitration.2
It is important to distinguish between judicial review of the
union's grievance investigation procedures and review of the sub-
stantive reasons for the decision. The standard for an adequate in-
vestigation should reflect both the nature of the issues raised by
266. The distinction in the cases is not very clear between whether a union's decision to
favor one group over another within a bargaining unit is "arbitrary" because it is procedur-
ally defective in the sense of the union's not investigating all interests, or because the union
acted for reasons not included within its statutory obligations. Compare Smith v. Hussmann
Refrigerator Co., 619 F.2d 1229 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 839 (1980), with Branch
6000, National Ass'n of Letter Carriers v. NLRB, 595 F.2d 808 (D.C. Cir. 1979); Barton
Brands, Ltd. v. NLRB, 529 F.2d 793 (7th Cir. 1976), and Truck Drivers Local Union 568 v.
NLRB, 379 F.2d 137 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
267. This recommendation does mean that nonmembers are treated differently from
members in duty of fair representation proceedings. The different treatment, however, is
only at the procedural level. The burden is placed on the union to provide a justification for
its decision to deny the grievance. The substantive standard, in terms of whether the justifi-
cation is rationally related to the union's statutory obligation, should be the same for both
members and nonmembers. There is no reason to question the "adequacy of representation"
by the union and to shift the production burden unless the employee can demonstrate a
reason to doubt the union's impartiality. As a practical matter, however, this recommenda-
tion should encourage unions to provide all employees with a justification beyond simply
stating that a grievance lacks merit. A written justification will be necessary to discourage
fair representation actions by nonmembers, and the union will want to treat all bargaining




the grievance and the reality of the union's limited resources. The
procedures a union follows should embody basic notions of fairness
to the employee and should provide sufficient information to allow
the union to make an informed decision.
2 68
The extent to which a court or PERC should second-guess the
union's substantive decision not to grieve is a more difficult issue.
Due process concerns relate primarily to whether procedures for
making the decision were fair and unbiased. Similarly, fair repre-
sentation doctrine only asks whether a decision was arbitrary or in
bad faith. The suggested approach here goes further. When there
are reasons beyond the tension over arbitration costs for question-
ing the union's impartiality, the union should be required to
demonstrate that its reasons for not arbitrating are rationally re-
lated to the merits of the grievance and are consistent with the
union's statutory responsibility to strive for better working condi-
tions and wages for all employees.2 69
268. [I]f a union representative makes no effort to communicate with the persons
directly affected by its actions and takes action without investigation or ade-
quate notice and opportunity to be heard, these acts and omissions may consti-
tute a breach of the duty of fair representation.
NLRB v. American Postal Workers Union, 618 F.2d 1249, 1255 (1980) (citing Minnis v.
International Union, 531 F.2d 850, 853-54 (8th Cir. 1975)); Retana v. Apartment, Motel,
Hotel and Elevator Operators Union Local No. 14, 453 F.2d 1018, 1024 (9th Cir. 1972), see
also Cox, The Duty of Fair Representation, 2 VILL. L. REV. 151, 163 (1957); Comment, The
Duty of Fair Representation: A Theoretical Structure, 51 TEx. L. REV. 1119, 1131 (1973).
269. If there is no basis for questioning a union's impartiality, the burden of producing
evidence on this issue remains on the employee. The union is presumed to be an adequate
representative unless the employee can produce some evidence to challenge this presump-
tion. One obvious criticism of the rational relationship standard is the lack of a substantive
theory of justice by which to measure a union's decision to favor one group of employees
over another. Setting a standard to identify When decisionmaking is procedurally unfair is
less troubling, because a court can rely on the statutory objectives of keeping channels of
communication open and reinforcing the democratic structure of unions. Courts are much
less comfortable in holding that the substantive outcome of a procedurally fair process is
unfair to a minority of the union or an individual. Such a conclusion is in tension with the
underlying principle of majority rule in collective bargaining. It suggests that judges should
look to their own basic values about distributive justice and apply these values to the trade-
offs involved in specific union decisions. This leaves no unifying principles, beyond the value
structure of individual judges, to make decisions predictable. See Freed, Polsby & Spitzer,
supra note 7.
Professor Ely has responded to a similar dilemma in constitutional law between strict
"clause-bound "interpretivism" on the one hand and the search for fundamental values on
the other by arguing for a "broad form of interpretivism" deriving general themes from the
constitutional document in its entirety. J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF
JUDICIAL REVIEW 12 (1980). In a similar sense, courts can look to the underlying structure of
labor legislation in terms of the model of collective bargaining that the legislation encour-
ages and fosters. The model is based on values that are both substantive and procedural in
character. See, e.g., Feller, supra note 1; Cox, supra note 1; Finkin, supra note 7; Stone,
1983]
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If the union is unable to articulate reasons that satisfy these
two requirements, this should indicate either that its motives are
suspect or that its decision was arbitrary in the sense that it did
not reflect the merits of the employee's complaint or the union's
statutory responsibility. If the union does provide substantial rea-
sons, then the production burden should shift back to the em-
ployee to provide specific evidence demonstrating that the union's
reasons are a pretext. For example, the employee might show that
when union members have had similar grievances the union
processed them to arbitration.2 70
If PERC had taken this approach in Galbreath, the commis-
sion might have ruled the same way, but the record would have
been more complete. Galbreath claimed that the employer violated
the collective agreement by refusing to compensate him for over-
time necessitated by special circumstances.2 1 The school board su-
perintendent refused overtime compensation because the work was
not authorized in advance. The pertinent clause of the contract
provided for compensation for any "excess assignment at the em-
ployee's hourly rate." 7 The issue was one of past practice and
contract interpretation in the sense of whether this clause only
meant prior authorized assignments or also overtime work growing
out of an employee's normal assignment when the overtime was
necessary to protect school property.2 7 3 Galbreath claimed (a) that
his grievance raised a question of past practice and contract inter-
pretation, (b) that it was denied as unnmeritorious, and (c) that
his status as a nonmember prompted the denial. Had the sug-
gested approach been used, Galbreath could have shifted the bur-
den to the union to produce evidence of a thorough investigation of
the grievance and of substantive reasons for denying it. Instead,
PERC dismissed the grievance in summary proceedings because
Galbreath had not alleged specific facts to support a finding of bad
faith by the union.27
supra note 1. The underlying structure may be contradictory and therefore not subject to
reduction to a unifying set of principles, but this result is simply a reflection of reality.
Labor policy is based on values in tension, but the lack of coherence does not mean that
courts should avoid the task of mediating these tensions in the context of specific cases.
270. See, e.g., Mosley v. General Dynamics Corp., 112 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 3388 (D. Mass.
Feb. 3, 1983).
271. Answer Brief of Appellee at 3-4, Galbreath v. School Bd., 424 So. 2d 837 (Fla. 4th
DCA 1982).
272. Answer Brief of Appellee at 5 n.4 (quoting the Collective Agreement, Art. VI, Sec.
F).
273. Id. at 4.
274. Galbreath v. Broward County Classroom Teachers' Ass'n, [1981] 7 F.P.E.R.
[Vol. 37:573
LABOR LAW
PERC did not require the union to provide any justification
for its decision that the grievance lacked merit. If PERC required
unions to provide a reasoned explanation in such cases, bargaining
agents would be encouraged to provide employees, particularly
nonmember employees, with written statements of the reasons for
finding grievances unmeritorious. This would constrain the union's
discretion, but in a positive way. If a union is unable to articulate
its justification for not proceeding, it should take the grievance to
arbitration.
The same basic approach may be used where an employer and
a bargaining agent settle a grievance, and the employee objects to
the settlement. If there is any conflict of interest between the
union and the employee suggesting possible bias, the union should
be required to demonstrate to PERC that the settlement was rea-
sonable under the circumstances.2 In reviewing the justification,
PERC must keep in mind the policy of encouraging unions and
employers to settle grievances early, during the initial steps of
grievance procedures. The settlement should be reasonably related
to the merits of the grievance and the union's statutory
responsibilities.
One objection to shifting the production burden where an em-
ployee can show tension between the interests of the employee and
those of the union is that it will be more difficult for the union to
obtain summary judgment in unfounded fair representation ac-
tions by nonmembers.2 7  A greater number of weak cases may
reach juries if Florida courts accept jurisdiction over public sector
fair representation cases. A union may choose to arbitrate an un-
meritorious grievance rather than run the risk of an expensive and
time-consuming lawsuit. Arbitration may be overused for griev-
12,288 (June 26, 1981).
275. See, e.g., Gregg v. Teamsters Local 150, 699 F.2d 1015 (9th Cir. 1983) (a union
must have substantial reasons to sacrifice one group of employee grievances in order to im-
prove the likelihood of succeeding with the grievances of other employees).
276. Summary judgment is appropriate where there is no genuine issue of material fact.
FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.510(c). Cases that involve motivate present particular problems because
they turn on the credibility of the witnesses presenting affidavits. See Conrad v. Delta Air
Lines, Inc., 494 F.2d 914 (7th Cir. 1974). PERC has held, however, that the mere allegation
of bad faith motive is insufficient to avoid a summary dismissal, which is analogous to a
summary judgment in court. Galbreath v. Broward County Classroom Teachers' Ass'n,
[1981] 7 F.P.E.R. 12,288 (June 26, 1981). Such proof of motive is always difficult to obtain,
because the defendant controls all evidence regarding the decision not to arbitrate. There-
fore, more cases are likely to end early because of the charging party's inability to obtain
evidence on motive than would be the case if the production burden shifted and the court
examined the union's justification.
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ances that should be settled.
There are two ways to minimize these difficulties. First, unions
might adjust their grievance investigation procedures to avoid any
claims based on lack of procedural fairness. Also, employees whose
grievances are denied as unmeritorious might be provided with an
explanation of the union's decision. The explanation may keep em-
ployees from feeling that the union acted arbitrarily or without
giving full consideration to an employee's situation. A written jus-
tification would also make it easier for the union to meet its bur-
den in summary proceedings and to obtain an early dismissal of
any fair representation charge.
Second, Florida courts might apply the doctrine of primary ju-
risdiction and rule that public employees initially must file fair
representation claims with PERC as unfair labor practice cases.2 77
PERC could dismiss in summary proceedings those cases in which
the union provides a reasonable justification for its decision not to
arbitrate. If the union acted unfairly to the employee or does not
provide substantial reasons for its refusal to arbitrate, then PERC
should order an arbitration in which the grievant would participate
in the selection of the arbitrator and would have the option of hav-
ing independent counsel represent him. For the purpose of allocat-
ing to the union that portion of any award caused by the union's
initial decision not to arbitrate, PERC could retain jurisdiction.2 7 8
Forcing employees to bring their cases to PERC rather than to
the courts reduces the harassment value of fair representation ac-
tions by employees hoping for settlement offers. It also avoids the
problem of juries that do not understand the need for union con-
trol over individual grievances or that have a tendency to award
excessive damages because of sympathy for an individual
277. See Odham v. Foremost Dairies, Inc., 128 So. 2d 586 (Fla. 1961); State ex rel.
Dep't of Gen. Servs. v. Willis, 344 So. 2d 580 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977); PERC v. Fraternal Order
of Police, Local Lodge No. 38, 327 So. 2d 43 (Fla. 2d DCA 1976); cf. PERC v. District School
Bd., 374 So. 2d 1005 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979); Maxwell v. School Bd., 330 So. 2d 177 (Fla. 4th
DCA 1976) (PERA only preempts state court jurisdiction over conflicts between employers
and employees if the activity in question is arguably an unfair labor practice in violation of
PERA).
278. If Florida courts decide to exercise dual jurisdiction in fair representation actions
and to follow federal court precedent, which allows a judgment for damages against a union
based on the extent to which the union's breach of its duty of fair representation increased
the harm suffered by the individual employee, then the financial risks to the union in a fair
representation action will increase substantially. See Bowen v. United States Postal Serv.,
103 S. Ct. 588 (1983). In a case of discharge, the union would run a substantial financial risk
in declining to grieve for a nonmember on the ground that the grievance lacked merit if




Arguments in support of concurrent jurisdiction by courts and
PERC in fair representation actions normally are based on the way
the doctrine has developed in the private sector. The explanation
for this concurrent jurisdiction is primarily historical rather than
substantive. It makes little sense for Florida courts to follow suit
simply because federal courts initially implied a cause of action
from the NLRA.25 °
There is still the possibility that a rival union may encourage
its members to file fair representation actions against the certified
bargaining agent that declines nonmembers' grievances as unmer-
itorious. The rival union could do this simply to gain support
among bargaining unit employees and to disrupt relations between
the certified union and the employees. A union faced with this sit-
uation would be cautious in denying a nonmember's grievance any-
way. The standard suggested here would encourage such caution as
well as require the bargaining agent to be prepared to demonstrate
to PERC its reasons for denying a nonmember's grievance.
3. GRIEVING FOR THE NONMEMBER AND INDIVIDUAL REPRESENTATION
Bargaining agents will normally opt to grieve for nonmembers
and either settle the grievance or take it to arbitration. The agent's
incentive to grieve for the nonmember increases if a rival union is
challenging the certified union. From the viewpoint of the non-
member, however, the problem of bias persists, particularly if the
employee is associated with the rival union. The certified union
may be extra careful to avoid creating any basis for a fair represen-
279. See Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 198-203 (1967) (Fortas, J., concurring).
280. Under the NLRA, an employee has the option of filing a fair representation action
in court for equitable relief, damages, or both, or of filing an unfair labor practice charge
with the NLRB. See Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171 (1967). As yet, Florida courts have not
ruled on the issue whether they will exercise concurrent jurisdiction with PERC over an
action for breach of the duty of fair representation under PERA. The Second District Court
of Appeal, citing the federal court decisions as precedent, has ruled that Florida courts have
concurrent jurisdiction in an action to enforce an agreement to arbitrate under a collective
agreement. PERC v. District School Bd., 374 So. 2d 1005 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979). However, a
contract enforcement action is distinguishable from a breach of fair representation action.
The historical development of the fair representation doctrine, rather than compelling argu-
ments against finding exclusive jurisdiction in the NLRB, justifies the dual jurisdiction of
the NLRB and federal courts. See Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 198-203 (1967) (Fortas, J.,
concurring). Florida could avoid many of the problems inherent in the dual jurisdiction of
the courts and the threat of damage remedies against unions by applying the doctrine of
primary and exclusive jurisdiction to all unfair labor practices under PERA, including
breaches of the duty of fair representation. See Bodensock v. AFSCME, Local 587, 81
L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2639 (Wis. Cir. Ct. Oct. 18, 1972).
19831
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
tation charge. Nevertheless, the employee will naturally suspect
the union of doing just enough to avoid any evidence of bad faith
while in fact giving union members higher quality representation.
These inherent problems do not mean that a nonmember has
any basis for establishing a prima facie fair representation charge
against a union once the grievance goes to arbitration. Labor policy
strongly favors the finality of arbitration, and unions should be en-
couraged to arbitrate the grievances of nonmembers without fear
of subsequent litigation.281 Once an arbitrator has decided the em-
ployee's grievance on the merits, there is no reason to question the
result unless the employee can produce evidence to prove affirma-
tively that the union failed to represent him adequately.
282
A sub-issue is whether the individual grievant should be al-
lowed to have his own counsel present to observe or participate in
the arbitration.25 Unless there is a conflict of interests between the
grievant and the union that would raise a serious question whether
the union will adequately represent the employee, participation by
outside counsel is not justified. An analogy may be drawn to the
requirement under federal rule 23(a)(4) that a class action be certi-
fied only if the named party is an adequate representative of the
unnamed parties.284 If there is tension between the interests of the
named representatives and the unnamed class members, final judg-
ment will not bind the latter unless they were given notice and an
opportunity to participate in the litigation as a subclass.288 Courts
are sensitive to the unfairness inherent in determining any individ-
ual's rights in a proceeding in which he has had no opportunity to
be heard or to be adequately represented.88
281. See'Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171 (1967); United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel &
Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960); cf. Hines v. Anchor Motor Freight, Inc., 424 U.S. 554 (1976)
(If a union does not fairly represent employee grievants because of personal hostility to the
employees, an arbitrator's award will not be final and binding as to the grievant's contrac-
tual rights.).
282. See Hines v. Anchor Motor Freight, Inc., 424 U.S. 554 (1976).
283. See Schatzki, supra note 65, at 908. Most courts that have confronted this issue
have ruled against an individual employee's request to have his own counsel participate in
grievance proceedings when the union is acting as the grievant's representative. See Malone
v. United States Postal Serv., 526 F.2d 1099 (6th Cir. 1975); Laney v. Ford Motor Co., 95
L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2002 (D. Minn. Mar. 29, 1977); Russell v. Patterson, 55 A.D.2d 619, 389
N.Y.S.2d 411 (1976).
284. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(4).
285. See Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32 (1940); Gonzales v. Cassidy, 474 F.2d 67 (5th
Cir. 1973).
286. See Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32 (1940); Gonzales v. Cassidy, 474 F.2d 67 (5th
Cir. 1973). Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure was designed with sensitivity to
the due process requirements to which the rule is subject. See FED. R. Civ. P. 23 advisory
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In the context of labor policy, courts have tended to allow un-
ions substantial discretion to bind all employees in a bargaining
unit to the results of arbitration or litigation, irrespective of con-




an employer discharged sixty-three employees because of an unau-
thorized work stoppage. The union forced arbitration by filing suit
under section 301(a) of the Labor-Management Relations Act. The
arbitrator ordered reinstatement of all but sixteen of the grievants.
The employees whose grievances were denied attempted to inter-
vene in the section 301 suit under rule 24 of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure to vacate the arbitration award. Both the union
and the employer opposed the employees. The court denied inter-
vention, even though the union was unwilling to continue making
legal arguments on behalf of the sixteen employees requesting in-
tervention. The court reasoned that for a union to function effi-
ciently, "to some extent the interests of particular individuals are
subordinated to the interests of the group both at the contract ad-
ministration stage and thereafter. '"I" Unless the employees could
show that animus against the grievants motivated the union, they
could not intervene.8 9
In Acuff, the employees had made no allegation suggesting
bad faith by the union. There was no inherent conflict besides that
arising from the union's unwillingness to bear the costs of proceed-
ing with an action to vacate the award. This is unlike the situation
of the nonmember, in which the inherent tension created by the
fact of nonmembership alone would be sufficient at least to allow
the grievant a choice of counsel to represent him.
Only a flexible assessment of the interests on each side can
committee notes. Similar due process issues are implicit in the exclusive representation
model of grievance processing under PERA. The union has exclusive control over the selec-
tion of the attorney or union official who will represent the grievant. If there is a conflict
between the union and the grievant over the merits of the grievance, or because of the
grievant's nonmembership in the union, the individual employee may regard the union at-
torney as having interests that conflict with his concerns, making the union attorney an
inadequate representative. Section 447.401 of the Florida Statutes guarantees employees ac-
cess to a fair and equitable grievance procedure to resolve contract claims. Compelling an
employee to be represented by an attorney who is committed to'interests either adverse to,
or in tension with, the grievant's interests could be viewed as both a statutory violation and
a denial of due process. For analogous reasoning in relation to the appointment of counsel
for indigent defendants in criminal proceedings, see United States v. Davis, 604 F.2d 474,
479 (7th Cir. 1979); Drumgo v. Superior Court, 8 Cal. 3d 930, 934-35, 506 P.2d 1007, 1010,
106 Cal. Rptr. 631, 634 (1973).
287. 404 F.2d 169 (5th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 987 (1969).
288. Id. at 171.
289. Id.
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resolve the issues. The Seventh Circuit took such a flexible ap-
proach in F.W. Woolworth Co. v. Miscellaneous Warehousemen's
Union, Local No. 781.1 0 In Woolworth the arbitrator ruled in
favor of the grievants, but the employer succeeded in an action to
have the district court set aside the award. The union did not ap-
peal the district court's ruling, and the employees intervened to
appeal. The employees did not allege that the union had breached
its duty of fair representation. The circuit court distinguished
Woolworth from Acuff on the ground that the union in Woolworth
did not oppose intervention, and the employees were attempting to
uphold an arbitrator's award rather than to set it aside. To deny
the employees their final day in court would create a perception of
unfairness.'
The court in Woolworth weighed the factors favoring interven-
tion against the facts that the union was no longer a participant
and that the employer and the courts would be put to the addi-
tional cost of the appeal. Because the union was passive, the court
assumed no collective interests were being undermined, and the
importance of fairness to the employees outweighed the costs to
the employer of continuing the litigation.
2 92
When the court's reasoning is applied to the issue of the non-
member's right to have his own counsel present in grievance pro-
ceedings, the factors in favor of allowing the presence of counsel
are (a) the enhanced appearance of fairness in light of the non-
member's natural tension with the bargaining agent, (b) protection
of the finality of the award by removing a possible basis for a fair
representation action, and (c) the protection of collective interests
through the bargaining agent's presence. Unless there is good rea-
son to believe that outside counsel would undermine the union's
ability to protect the interests of bargaining unit employees, the
arguments against allowing the nonmember to have independent
counsel present are not very strong.
If the grievant selects a representative who is affiliated with or
retained by a rival union, the balance of interests shifts against the
employee, because of the potential disruptive effect of the rival
union. If rival unions were allowed to represent bargaining unit
employees, nonmember grievances would make contract grievance
proceedings an open forum for a rival organization seeking em-
290. 629 F.2d 1204 (7th Cir. 1980).
291. Id. at 1211.
292. Id. at 1211-12.
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ployee support. This would have negative consequences for normal
contract administration and for stable labor relations.'" A rule al-
lowing nonmember representation, conditioned on the representa-
tive's having no relationship with a rival union, might cause suffi-
cient practical problems in particular cases to outweigh any gains
to an overall sense of fairness. "
Most courts that have faced the issue of a grievant's right to
have independent counsel participate in grievance proceedings
have ruled against the grievant.'"° Courts reason that the duty of
fair representation provides adequate protection for a grievant who
is unhappy with the quality of the union's representation in griev-
ance proceedings. However, they do not address the problem of the
conflict that results when the same attorney is handling the griev-
ance on behalf of both the union and the grievant. Union control
over grievances is an important value, but so is fairness to individ-
ual grievants. If a grievant has a legitimate reason for having inde-
pendent counsel present, and if counsel's presence would not un-
dermine the union's ability to represent the collective, then it
would be appropriate to allow outside counsel to participate under
conditions established by the arbitrator.2 "
At least one court, following a general balancing approach and
looking closely at the interests involved in the specific case, found
that it would be a violation of the duty of fair representation for a
union to refuse to process a grievance unless the employee agreed
to stop consulting with an outside attorney.'97 The court indicated
that an employee's consulting with an attorney could not compro-
mise the union's position as exclusive representative.
293. Silverstein, Union Decisions on Collective Bargaining Goals: a Proposal for Inter-
est Group Participation, 77 MICH. L. Rav. 1485, 1509 (1979).
294. For a negative view by an arbitrator who has recently been involved in a series of
arbitrations where grievants requested to have their own counsel present, see Andrews &
Andrews, A Potential Threat to Labor Arbitration: The Case of the Uninvited Guest, 8 N.
Ky. L. REv. 315 (1981).
295. See Malone v. United States Postal Serv., 526 F.2d 1099 (6th Cir. 1975); Laney v.
Ford Motor Co., 95 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2002 (D. Minn. Mar. 29, 1977); Russell v. Patterson, 55
A.D.2d 619, 389 N.Y.S.2d 411 (1976).
296. The presence of counsel will partially undermine any challenge to an award based
on an argument that there was an inherent bias against the nonmember grievant in the
arbitration process. See Summers, supra note 1, at 402; cf. Schatzki, supra note 65, at 908
n.28.
297. Seymour v. Olin Corp., 666 F.2d 202, 209 (5th Cir. 1982). In dicta the court com-
mented as follows on a union's power to prohibit the mere presence of private counsel at
grievance proceedings: "In most instances, a union's power in this regard can only be deter-
mined by an analysis of the collective bargaining agreement and the particular facts
presented by the individual case." Id. at 209 n.5.
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The point in the grievance process at which outside counsel
should first be allowed to participate also presents a problem.
Outside representation may disrupt attempts by the employer and
the union to settle grievances during the early stages of grievance
proceedings. This is a valid concern. Most grievances are settled
before arbitration. The union and employer have experience with
similar grievances; they can predict how an arbitrator will rule; and
they are under financial pressure to avoid the costs of arbitration.
The union and the employer are in the best position to know what
is a reasonable settlement. The grievant and his representative
should be allowed to be present at the early stages, but the union
should have control over the negotiations and should have the au-
thority to settle.'"
4. UNION VERSUS THE GRIEVANT ON THE MERITS
The last circumstance is where an individual grievant and the
union disagree over the merits of the individual's grievance. The
certified bargaining agent may refuse to arbitrate either because
the union does not support the grievant's interpretation of the con-
tract, or because the union feels it would not be in the best inter-
ests of a majority of employees for the grievance to go forward.
During collective bargaining, unions constantly balance con-
flicting interests among employees. This balancing function is one
of the major policy justifications for collective bargaining, and un-
ions play the same role in contract administration. Nevertheless,
courts tend to scrutinize union decisions that favor one group over
another more closely when the decisions occur in the context of
grievance arbitration than when they arise in collective bargain-
ing." o Courts assume that, in bargaining, only the views of the
union's membership should constrain the union. When a contract
is in place, however, the contract creates individual employee ex-
pectancies, and the situation changes. Courts may also treat differ-
ently situations where a union declines a grievance for reasons con-
sistent with its statutory obligations as compared with situations in
which considerations other than working conditions appear to in-
fluence the union's judgment. 00
298. For a discussion of the standard a court should apply if a grievant attacks the
settlement as constituting a breach of the union's duty of fair representation, see infra text
accompanying notes 302-06.
299. See Leffler, supra note 7.
300. See Barton Brands, Ltd. v. NLRB, 529 F.2d 793 (7th Cir. 1976) (the union may
not make seniority decisions solely on the grounds that the favored group is the majority);
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There is a considerable body of scholarly commentary on the
major cases involving these types of conflicts.3 01 While it is beyond
the scope of this article to critique this literature, the reader
should note the extent to which the approach of the principal pri-
vate sector cases is subject to due process challenges when public
sector labor agreements are the source of employee expectations.
The major Supreme Court case involving a union taking sides
in a conflict among employees is Humphrey v. Moore.302 That case
involved a trucking company merger, where the two groups of em-
ployees disagreed over seniority rights in the surviving company.
One union represented both employee groups, and a joint commit-
tee adopted its recommendation that the seniority lists be
dovetailed.803 The acquired company was the older of the two busi-
nesses, so its employees generally had more seniority when the lists
were merged on a date-of-hire basis. Subsequently, layoffs oc-
curred and employees who had been with the acquiring company
since its inception were among the first to be laid off. They filed
suit, and a state court held that the union breached its duty to
represent fairly all employees by taking sides in the dispute. 04 The
Supreme Court reversed.
The Court emphasized (a) that dovetailing was a reasonable
interpretation of the relevant clause of the collective agreement by
the joint committee, (b) that the solution was an equitable way of
dealing with the situation, (c) that the union need not be neutral
in a conflict among employees and was free to take a good-faith
position, and (d) that the disfavored employees had notice of the
joint committee hearing and an opportunity to state their
position.308
Though most authority would disagree, a joint committee de-
Truck Drivers Local Union 568 v. NLRB, 379 F.2d 137 (D.C. Cir. 1967) (a bargaining agent
represents all employees and cannot make distinctions among employees based solely on
their political power); Gregg v. Teamsters Local 150, 699 F.2d 1015 (9th Cir. 1983) (a union
must have substantial reasons to sacrifice the grievances of one group of employees in order
to improve the likelihood of succeeding on the grievances of other employees).
301. See, e.g., Blumrosen, supra note 7; Finkin, supra note 7; Freed, Polsby & Spitzer,
supra note 7; Leffler, supra note 7; Levy, supra note 7; Summers, supra note 7.
302. 375 U.S. 335 (1964).
303. Dovetailing seniority lists means that seniority will be based on date of employ-
ment with either of two companies. If the lists had been endtailed, the employees of the
absorbed company would have their seniority tacked on below that of the employees of the
absorbing company.
304. Moore v. Local 89, Int'l Bd. of Teamsters, 356 S.W.2d 241 (Ky. 1962), rev'd sub
nom. Humphrey v. Moore, 375 U.S. 335 (1964).
305. Humphrey v. Moore, 375 U.S. 335, 345-50 (1964).
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cision in a case such as Humphrey v. Moore should be analyzed in
the same way as a union decision not to arbitrate. 06 A joint com-
mittee is composed of equal numbers of union and management
representatives, and a grievance before the committee goes to a
neutral arbitrator only if union and management disagree. In a
grievance over a matter such as seniority lists, the employer is
likely to go along with whatever the union decides is best for its
members. The union, therefore, makes the decision, and a neutral
arbitrator does not hear the grievance unless the union decides
against taking a position.
The Supreme Court did not indicate whether the result would
have been different had the union in Humphrey advocated merg-
ing seniority lists in a manner inconsistent with a specific contract
clause. For example, Professor Summers has argued that if the col-
lective agreement called for dovetailing seniority lists in case of a
merger, and the union decided instead to slot employees according
to relative seniority in each plan, the union's decision should be
viewed as arbitrary.807 A union should act in good faith to seek the
most equitable solution for all employees, but its actions must be
consistent with the collective agreement.
The legal basis of Professor Summer's position is even firmer
in the public sector. A collective retroactive waiver of specific job
security guarantees, to benefit one group of employees at the ex-
pense of another group, arguably deprives the latter of a property
interest without due process. 08 It is true that job security guaran-
tees in an agreement normally are not vested. They may be
changed if the union agrees with the employer to amend the agree-
ment prospectively. If the contract is amended, employees must
adjust their expectancies just as though the legislature had
amended a statute providing for job security. As long as the con-
tract is not amended, however, the union should not be allowed to
waive retroactively the contract rights of a minority simply be-
cause all employees would be better off. Employees have a right to
306. This view of joint committee awards is shared by various commentators. See
Feller, supra note 1; Rabin, The Duty of Fair Representation in Arbitration in THE DUTY
OF FAIR REPRESENTATION 84, 87 (J. McKelvey ed. 1977); Comment, supra note 268, at 1169.
It is not the view of the Supreme Court, which treats joint committee awards as equivalent
to a final and binding decision by a neutral arbitrator. See General Drivers Local Union No.
89 v. Riss & Co., 372 U.S. 517, 519 (1963); Humphrey v. Moore, 375 U.S. 335 (1964); Hines
v. Anchor Motor Freight, 424 U.S. 554 (1976).
307. Summers, supra note 7, at 266-68.
308. See Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134 (1974); Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593
(1972); Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972).
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expect their bargaining agent and their public employer to act con-
sistently with the specific terms of the collective agreement, just as
they expect them to comply with a statutory guarantee. 30 9
Generally, situations of conflict among employees are not so
clear-cut. Contract clauses are open to different interpretations. To
clarify an ambiguous clause, the union may need to take a position
that favors one group of employees over another. The union may
be in conflict with a minority of employees, which raises serious
questions as to' how the minority's interests are to be heard. It
makes no sense, however, to require the union to remain neutral if
it feels a particular interpretation is in the best interest of the
collective.31 0
Whenever a majority of employees gains benefits at the ex-
pense, of a minority or of an individual, a question arises whether
the union favored the majority to solidify its position as the exclu-
sive representative. Union motives in such a situation are almost
impossible to discern. There is an inherent conflict between the
union, with its need to please the majority, and those employees
who are on the minority side of any issue. This observation, how-
ever, simply reiterates that the union's actions normally will reflect
majority preferences. Fair representation doctrine provides no sub-
stantive theory of justice against which these decisions can be mea-
sured.311 Courts, therefore, tend to seek a partial solution in proce-
dural fairness. The burden should be placed on the union to
articulate its reasons for sacrificing minority interests. Following
the Court's reasoning in Humphrey, the union should have to show
that (a) the solution it advocates is a reasonable interpretation of
the relevant contract clause, 12 (b) the decision is an equitable so-
lution to a conflict among employee interests, s (c) the position is
consistent with the union's statutory obligation to clarify employee
rights, " ' (d) it made a complete investigation of all. interests before
arriving at its conclusions, and (e) disfavored employees were given
notice of the investigation or hearing and had an opportunity to
state their position.1 5
309. Barton Brands, Ltd. v. NLRB, 529 F.2d 793 (7th Cir. 1976).
310. Humphrey v. Moore, 375 U.S. 335 (1964); See Summers, supra note 7, at 268-69.
311. See Freed, Polsby & Spitzer, supra note 7.
312. Humphrey v. Moore, 375 U.S. 335, 345 (1964).
313. Id. at 347.
314. Id. at 349 (a statutory bargaining representative should not be neutralized in a
conflict between two groups of employees so long as the union acts in good faith to fulfill its
statutory obligations.)
315. Id. at 350.
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A preferable solution to such a conflict would be for the union
to take the issue to a neutral arbitrator and allow the disfavored
employees to participate through their own counsel in both the se-
lection of the arbitrator and the arbitration proceedings. If the
union chooses, as in Humphrey, not to take the case to a neutral
arbitrator, it does not thereby violate its duty of fair representa-
tion. The union must, however, if it chooses not to arbitrate, be
able to articulate reasons for its decision. So long as the union's
reasons reflect its statutory obligations, a court should let the deci-
sion stand. Any other result would undermine the critical role the
union plays in balancing the conflicting interests of employees.
Two cases, one involving private sector employees and the
other public employees, exemplify this procedural fairness ap-
proach. In Smith v. Hussmann Refrigerator Co., 1' the Eighth Cir-
cuit held that a union breached its duty of fair representation by
seeking with the employer to modify an arbitration award without
giving affected employees notice or opportunity to be heard. Plain-
tiff employees had obtained their positions after bidding under a
clause that provided that seniority should govern promotions when
factors of ability and skill were substantially equal among the em-
ployees being considered. 17 The union grieved on behalf of four
unsuccessful bidders who were senior to the four employees
awarded the jobs. The union did not investigate the relative ability
of the bidding employees. The successful bidders were not invited
to attend the arbitration hearing; their interests were only de-
fended by the employer's foreman. 8" The arbitrator ruled that two
of the grievants as well as the four successful bidders were entitled
to the job classification in question. The union objected to the
award on the grounds that it created six classifications from four
posted jobs and that there were other technical errors in the
award.1 9 The union and employer met to discuss these problems,
and then they met with the arbitrator to clarify the award. At this
meeting, the union and the employer informed the arbitrator of
their agreement that two of the grievants and two of the successful
bidders should be granted the four posted classifications. At a sec-
ond meeting with the arbitrator, he so ruled.820 The previously suc-
cessful employees who were deprived of their job classifications
316. 619 F.2d 1229 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 839 (1980).
317. Id. at 1233.
318. Id.




brought a fair representation action against the union and a claim
for breach of the collective agreement against the employer. The
jury returned verdicts in favor of the plaintiffs, but the district
court granted the defendants' motion for judgment notwithstand-
ing the verdict."'
The circuit court of appeals, sitting en banc, reversed. Six
judges felt that the union's failure to give the disfavored employees
notice of the second meeting with the arbitrator, and its failure to
represent these employees' interests, violated the duty of fair rep-
resentation.32 2 In a plurality opinion, three judges suggested that
the union also violated its duty by not investigating the relative
ability of the grievants and the successful bidders before deciding
to grieve, by not inviting the successful bidders to the first arbitra-
tion, and by not providing representation for disfavored
employees.32 8
The union argued that its decision to grieve without investi-
gating the relative ability of the employees was based on the neu-
tral principle that seniority should govern in bidding for open job
classifications. This position of the union implies that the reference
in the collective agreement to relative ability of bidding employees
was a concession to the employer. Traditionally, if an employer re-
lies on ability as a justification for promoting a less senior em-
ployee, and the unsuccessful bidder complains, the union grieves
on behalf of the more senior employee.
The plurality opinion challenged the union's judgment on the
question of seniority versus ability as a standard for promotion
and suggested that the union violated a clear term of the agree-
ment by taking the approach of always favoring seniority. The plu-
rality concludes that the union's action was arbitrary and contrary
to the expectations of the employees based on the wording of the
collective agreement."2 4 The heart of the problem is that the union
had made a judgment that following a neutral principle of senior-
ity in promotions serves the best interests of all employees. When
the union in bargaining obtained only a modified seniority clause,
it nonetheless continued to grieve job assignments that were not
consistent with seniority.
It is not the role of the court to second-guess the union on this
321. Id. at 1232.
322. Id. at 1241-42; id. at 1246 (Lay, J., concurring); id. at 1246-47 (Bright and Ross,
JJ., concurring).
323. Id. at 1240-42.
324. Id. at 1238-39.
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sort of policy, as did the plurality in Smith. The important consid-
eration is the expectancies of the employees. If the past practice of
the union is to grieve on behalf of the more senior employee in
such situations, and the employees understand this policy, the
union's action is not arbitrary. The established policy is similar to
the union's decision to favor one group of employees over another
in collective bargaining. The burden is on the membership to alter
such policies through the union's internal political process. Courts
have no theory of substantive justice to provide a basis for a find-
ing that the union made an "unjust" decision, so long as the union
was not procedurally unfair to the minority employees and the cri-
teria for the decision were related to the union's role as bargaining
agent.
The union should not, however, be able to defeat a fair repre-
sentation action by the successful bidders simply by pointing to
the neutral principle of seniority. As plaintiffs, the successful bid-
ders raised a conflict between their interest in being promoted on
the basis of both seniority and ability and the union's interest in
seniority alone as the governing criterion. The plaintiffs' interpre-
tation of employee rights was more consistent with the contract
itself. To overcome such a prima facie showing of a fair representa-
tion breach, the union should have the burden of demonstrating
that the employees reasonably should have expected the union to
follow the seniority principle. The union might show its past prac-
tice of grieving for the more senior employee, or if no past practice
exists, that the policy had been sufficiently disseminated among
the employees to avoid contrary expectations.2 5 The union essen-
tially must demonstrate that it is not retroactively waiving existing
employee expectations. If the union cannot carry this burden, it
should not settle the grievance short of arbitration without an in-
vestigation of the employees' relative ability.
If the case is not settled, and it goes to arbitration, the suc-
cessful bidders should be given notice, invited to attend the arbi-
tration, and offered an opportunity to defend their interests
through their own counsel or through an independent advocate
paid by the union. In the private sector, this approach would
325. If the union treats all employees uniformly, the union's position will become a part
of industrial practice in conformance with the expectations of the employee community.
Employees similarly situated should be treated the same. See Butler v. Local 823, Int'l Bhd.
of Teamsters, 514 F.2d 442 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 924 (1975) (union could not
dovetail only the employees of the acquired company who were working at the date of the
merger and endtail employees on layoff at that date).
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strengthen the legitimacy of private arbitration as a means of
resolving labor disputes, including conflicts among groups of em-
ployees. The same labor policies are present in the public sector,
where they are reinforced by the due process requirement that an
employee not be deprived of individual job interests without notice
and an opportunity to be heard or adequately represented.
The New Jersey Supreme Court recently relied on similar rea-
soning to read into the statute governing collective bargaining for
public employees a requirement of notice and an opportunity to
participate in an arbitration hearing for a disfavored employee. 3 6
The plaintiff in Saginario v. Attorney General was promoted from
the rank of State Trooper I to Sergeant, and the bargaining agent
filed a grievance asserting that the promotion violated the agree-
ment. The agreement provided that in promotion decisions, a com-
petitive examination was to be weighted at thirty-four percent; the
other sixty-six percent was to be based on a combination of senior-
ity, performance, conduct record, medical condition, and job-re-
lated experience. 27 The union claimed that the plaintiff's promo-
tional points for experience and conduct were miscalculated. The
union asked that the trooper with the next highest overall promo-
tion points receive the promotion instead of the plaintiff. The
State Police Division denied the grievance, and the union took it to
arbitration. The plaintiff was not notified of either the grievance
proceedings or the arbitration hearing.
32 8
The arbitration focused on whether the plaintiff had received
the correct number of points for his prior experience and conduct
record. The only witness was the secretary of the promotion review
board. The arbitrator ruled for the union, and the plaintiff was re-
turned to the rank of Trooper I. The plaintiff appealed the demo-
tion, and the Appellate Division vacated the arbitrator's award and
ordered another arbitration in which the plaintiff was permitted to
participate. 29
The New Jersey Supreme Court affirmed. The court inter-
preted a provision in the New Jersey Employer-Employee Rela-
tions Act, which provides for binding grievance arbitration, to re-
quire the union to give an employee whose rights are affected by a
grievance an opportunity to be heard.330 The union was not repre-
326. See Saginario v. Attorney General, 87 N.J. 480, 435 A.2d 1134 (1981).
327. Id. at 482, 435 A.2d at 1135.
328. Id. at 483, 435 A.2d at 1135.
329. Id. at 483-84, 435 A.2d at 1135-36.
330. See Id. at 495-97, 435 A.2d at 1142.
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senting the employee who had been promoted because its position
on criteria for promotions was in conflict with the employee's in-
terests in retaining his promotion. The employer had other con-
cerns, including avoiding backpay, and the employer had no obli-
gation to represent the employee. The court held that the
employee had been denied his statutory right to a fair hearing be-
cause no one present at the hearing was an adequate representa-
tive for him. The court ordered a new arbitration with the em-
ployee participating, either through his own personal represent-
ative or pro se, and bearing his share of arbitration costs. By read-
ing the notice and hearing requirement into the statute, the court
explicitly avoided the issue of whether the plaintiff had such a
property interest in the terms of the agreement as to invoke the
requirement of due process." 1 The court also did not have to de-
cide whether the union violated its duty of fair representation.3 3 2
In a separate opinion, Justice Clifford argued that it was a
mistake for the court to avoid the question of whether the union
had acted arbitrarily, albeit in good faith, in not giving the em-
ployee notice that the union was abandoning the employee's inter-
ests or inviting him to participate in the proceedings. Justice Clif-
ford argued that, by taking a statutory approach, the majority ran
the risk of giving employees an inviolate right to a hearing when-
ever there is a conflict of interest between an employee and the
union. In contrast, fair representation doctrine is a fact-sensitive
body of law that developed on a case-by-case basis.333
Citing Smith v. Hussmann in support of his conclusion, Jus-
tice Clifford reasoned that the union had a legitimate interest in
grieving to clarify the evaluation standards used by the Division.
The union should be encouraged to do this, but the union should
also give employees, disfavored by its decision, notice and an op-
portunity to participate in the proceedings through independent
representation. By failing to give the affected employee an oppor-
tunity to participate, the union violated its duty of fair
representation.
3 4
The courts in both Smith and Saginario were sensitive to the
possibility of undermining the union's discretion to deal with con-
flicts among employees and to take positions that adversely affect
331. See Id. at 492 n.3, 435 A.2d at 1140 n.3.
332. See Id. at 497-511, 435 A.2d at 1142-50 (Clifford, J., dissenting in part on the
ground that the union breached its duty of fair representation).
333. Id.
334. Id. at 507-09, 435 A.2d at 1148.
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some employees to benefit the collective. Those cases combine def-
erence to union discretion with a basic principle of procedural fair-
ness-no individual should be deprived of legitimate job-security
expectations without an opportunity to be heard. This procedural
solution does not unduly burden the union, but it lessens union
control over employee input into contract administration. An em-
ployer might use the procedural protections to drive a wedge be-
tween minority employees and their bargaining agent, but the dan-
ger of this tactic is not great. In the long run, most public
employers benefit from a strong union that can control dissident
employees, negotiate settlements, and minimize litigation costs by
fairly treating all employees affected by union decisions.
The New Jersey Supreme Court's reliance on the employee's
statutory right to a fair hearing rather than on fair representation
doctrine is troublesome. The majority was sensitive to the lower
court's reliance on Donnelly v. United Fruit Co.,8" a 1963 decision
of the same court that was essentially overruled by Vaca. The New
Jersey Supreme Court devoted a substantial part of its opinion to
explaining why the court now agrees with Vaca. The court obvi-
ously was hesitant to confront the difficult issue of reconciling the
Vaca view of union control over grievances with its own holding
that the union had breached its statutory duty when the union's
good faith was not an issue." 6 It was a mistake for the Saginario
court to avoid evaluating its holding in light of fair representation
doctrine. Fair representation is a flexible doctrine that is sensitive
to conflicting interests. It takes account of policies underlying the
system of collective bargaining as it balances the interests of the
collective and of individual employees. Also, under fair representa-
tion doctrine, courts are not constrained by statutory language or
legislative intent.
It is also preferable to deal with these issues under fair repre-
sentation doctrine rather than under due process. The former con-
cept is rooted in labor policy and forces a court to confront directly
tensions between collective and individual interests. By directly
confronting this tension in specific factual situations, courts medi-
ate the conflict and help sustain the system of collective bargain-
ing. The policy choices which underlie the facts of each case could
be submerged too easily if courts retreat to general principles of
due process.
335. 40 N.J. 61, 190 A.2d 825 (1963).
336. Saginario v. Attorney General, 87 N.J. 480, 484-89, 435 A.2d 1134, 1136-38 (1981).
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IV. CONCLUSION
t
PERC has done a credible job of adjusting exclusive represen-
tation doctrine to deal with PERA's unique provision for nonmem-
bers. The union's right to refuse representation is inconsistent with
the theoretical assumptions of the exclusive bargaining agent
model of collective bargaining, but it does reflect practical realities.
There is tension between bargaining agents and nonmember em-
ployees in both the public and private sectors. The PERA amend-
ment forced PERC to confront this tension. The commission re-
sponded with sensitivity to the need to protect the bargaining
agent's control over contract issues, but it has not given sufficient
attention to individual employee interests. PERC's view of fair
representation should be altered to reflect the conflicts inherent in
grievance processing. Some possible changes suggested by the ex-
amination of these conflicts follow.
1. If a union refuses to process a nonmember's grievance for
reasons other than the employee's nonmembership in the union,
the union should carry the burden of explaining its decision. Plac-
ing the production burden on the union would encourage bargain-
ing agents to provide employees with written reasons for denying
grievances. If the employee files an unfair labor practice charge
with PERC, the union can obtain a summary dismissal if its rea-
sons for denying the grievance are reasonably related to its statu-
tory obligation to seek better working conditions for bargaining
unit employees.
2. The same procedure should apply where a union declines to
grieve for any employee, member or nonmember, in a situation in
which the union opposes the contract interpretation advocated by
the aggrieved employee in order to protect the interests of the ma-
jority. Where the union disagrees with the grievant on the merits
of the grievance and refuses to arbitrate to benefit other employ-
ees, the union should have to show (a) that it arrived at its deci-
sion through fair procedures that provided the grievant with notice
and an opportunity to be heard before the decision was made and
(b) that the union's substantive reasons for denying the grievance
are consistent with its statutory obligations.
3. If the union must choose between the interests of different
groups of employees in grievance arbitration, the disfavored em-
ployees should receive notice of the arbitration and an opportunity
to appear through their own counsel. The right to independent
counsel does not, however, include the right to select a representa-
tive who is affiliated with or retained by a rival union organization.
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The certified union also may find it useful to have the disfavored
employees participate in the selection of the neutral arbitrator to
minimize the possibility of a subsequent claim that the arbitrator
was biased.
4. If the union does decide to proceed with a nonmember's
grievance, and the nonmember nonetheless wishes to have his own
counsel present at the arbitration, this should be permitted. The
role of the grievant's counsel should be limited to observing the
arbitration, unless the arbitrator finds that the tension between
the union and the nonmember affects the quality of the union's
representation of the grievant.
5. If the union declines to grieve for an employee because of
the employee's nonmembership in the union, and the employee
proceeds individually under the contract, the union has a statutory
right to be present at all sessions with the employer and to partici-
pate in the arbitration proceedings. The union's participation may
be limited by the arbitrator to those issues implicating the rights
of other bargaining unit employees.
6. When the certified bargaining agent has refused to re-
present the employee because of the employee's nonmembership,
the nonmember should be allowed to select any representative, in-
cluding a rival union. This result keeps pressure on the certified
bargaining agent to represent all employees, including nonmem-
bers. If the bargaining agent does not fulfill that obligation, then
competition among unions may be better for overall employee in-
terests. So long as the bargaining agent is present at all confer-
ences and at the arbitration, maintaining consistency in contract
interpretation should not pose a problem. PERC's decision in PBA
was a practical solution to this problem, but PERC should monitor
its consequences carefully.
7. If a union declines to arbitrate for a member on the grounds
that the likelihood of success is too small to warrant the costs of
arbitrating, and there is no conflict between the grievant and the
union over the substantive issues raised by the grievance, the em-
ployee should have the burden of showing the union acted in bad
faith or arbitrarily. If the grievant is not a union member or if the
grievant can show a conflict with the union over the substantive
contract issues raised by the grievance, the union should have the
burden of explaining its decision not to grieve. In both circum-
stances the ultimate burden of persuasion On the issue of the arbi-
trariness of a union decision remains on the employee. Shifting the
production burden where a grievant can show conflict with the
1983l
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
union forces the union to articulate a rationale for its decision
while protecting the union's discretion to settle or to weed out
weak grievances. In the case of a nonmember, a union's refusal to
grieve should be treated as based on nonmembership unless the
union explicitly informs the grievant that the decision was made
because the grievance lacked merit.
3 7
These guidelines do not diverge sharply from the course
PERC has followed. They are aimed at fostering among employees'
the perception that contract grievance procedures are justly ad-
ministered and at preserving the bargaining agent's control over
these procedures.
The guidelines do not confront the central substantive issue of
what underlying principles courts should apply in determining
when a union's decision to favor one group of employees over an-
other is "not justified" or "is inconsistent with the union's statu-
tory obligation." Neither the cases nor the scholarly literature pro-
vides a substantive theory that could be used to address this
question. In fact, to search for basic unifying principles may be a
conceptual mistake. 83 8
Some tensions among values are simply irreconcilable. Law
mediates the inherent tensions and allows social institutions to em-
brace irreconcilable values that persist.
Fair representation fulfills a mediating function between the
collective and the individual. The doctrine lacks substantive con-
tent; instead it mediates substantive conflicts through procedural
fairness. In specific situations, courts have ruled that a union has
been substantively unfair to an employee, but these cases yield no
unifying principles. This does not mean that the doctrine of fair
representation should be abandoned, or that the legislature should
impose more particularized rules. On the contrary, fair representa-
tion doctrine provides a sensitive framework for courts to confront
conflicting values in specific factual contexts while avoiding abso-
lute value choices at a general level.
337. See Ritcey v. School Bd., [1982] 8 F.P.E.R. 13,282 (June 30, 1982).
338. For a thorough discussion of the "classical" tendency in American legal reasoning,
see Gudridge, The Persistence of Classical Style, 131 U. PA. L. REV. 663 (1983).
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